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INTRODUCTION
rp .E modem state action doctrine,' derived from Parker v. Brown,2
X gives antitrust immunity3 under certain circumstances both to regu-
latory actions of state and local governments and to private conduct reg-
ulated by state or local government. For a decade, the Supreme Court
has determined the scope of state action immunity using a formal, proce-
dural test that requires that an anticompetitive restraint implement state
regulatory policies and that private anticompetitive conduct be govern-
mentally supervised.4 The doctrine's purpose is to "resolve conflicts that
may arise between principles of federalism and the goal of the antitrust
laws, unfettered competition in the marketplace." 5 The resulting resolu-
tion is important to federalism because the regulatory autonomy of state
and local governments is at stake.6 The resolution is important to anti-
trust goals because state and local regulation can serve as an especially
effective device for facilitating cartelization and for protection of monop-
oly profits.7
1. For a discussion of antecedents, see Handler, The Current Attack on the Parker v.
Brown State Action Doctrine, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 8, 11-12 (1976).
2. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
3. The Court has referred to the effect of the state action doctrine as "immunity,"
e.g., Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 55
(1985); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943), and as "exemption," e.g., Southern
Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 55 n. 18; Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 45
(1985); New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 109 (1978). This
Article uses the term immunity. The point of the doctrine is that the Sherman Act was
not intended to apply to a certain class of state regulatory restraints. See Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 790 (1975) (grant of immunity depends on whether "an
anticompetitive activity is state action of the type the Sherman Act was not meant to
proscribe"); City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 393 n.8
(1978). This Article will not attempt to treat authoritatively the related "preemption"
doctrine, whose precise relation to the state action doctrine is still uncertain. See infra
note 78.
4. See, e.g., California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445
U.S. 97, 105 (1980) ("First, the challenged restraint must be 'one clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed as state policy'; second, the policy must be 'actively supervised' by
the State itself." (citing City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 410)). In the last decade, the Court
has substantially eased the requirements for immunity-particularly the policy require-
ment. See infra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
5. Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 61.
6. In addition to the legislatures, supreme courts and agencies of each state, there
are tens of thousands of units of local government whose regulatory decisionmaking po-
tentially is affected by this doctrine. See City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 407 & n.34 (1972
survey by the census bureau indicated 62,437 county, municipal and special district gov-
ernmental units in United States). In the Supreme Court's cases, questions of the doc-
trine's application have arisen in such contexts as state regulation of lawyers' advertising,
liquor pricing, truckers' rates and relocation of automobile dealerships, municipal regula-
tion of cable television service and municipal provision of electricity and sewage services.
See infra notes 64-66, 120, 219-235, 116, 126 & 136 and accompanying text.
7. A former Commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission has stated that "an-
ticompetitive acts by state and local governments represent one of the most significant
examples of the effective creation and maintenance of monopoly power in the U.S. econ-
omy." Douglas & Mullenix, Cities and States as Agents in Restraint of Trade, 31 Anti-
trust Bull. 505, 505 (1986). Government regulation can insulate monopolists and cartels
[Vol. 56
ANTITRUST IMMUNITY
A prominent theme in recent scholarship is evaluation of the state ac-
tion doctrine in terms of its impact on economic efficiency.' Not all state
and local regulation ultimately threatens antitrust goals, because regula-
tory displacement of competition is sometimes efficient. In this context
the Sherman Act9 is viewed as expressing a preference for efficiency, sat-
isfiable in certain markets by efficient regulation, rather than a categori-
cal preference for competitive markets over regulation.10 Thus, it is
inefficient state and local regulation that raises the direct policy conflict
between antitrust objectives and state and local self-determination. Inef-
ficiency in state and local regulation is attributed principally to two fac-
tors. First,'regulated entities may influence or "capture" the regulatory
process in ways that benefit themselves instead of consumers." I For ex-
ample, a regulated industry may persuade regulators to implement meas-
ures that effectively raise entry barriers or limit price competition.
Second, a divergence between the territorial limits of the regulating body
and the market in which the regulatory impact is felt may mean that the
regulatory process "exports" externalities to those beyond its bounda-
ries.12 For example, an effectively self-regulating municipal utility that
serves beyond the municipal boundaries may implement practices that
benefit its own citizens at the expense of noncitizens. 
3
Proposals to realign the scope of state action immunity according to
concepts of efficiency vary widely in the degree to which they would dis-
place state and local regulatory autonomy. Perhaps most comprehensive
is Professor Cirace's proposal to deny immunity where state or local reg-
ulation is "broader than the scope of substantial market failure"
presented or "whose implementation involves . . . official misconduct,
from problems they otherwise would face and thus permit much more stable enjoyment
of monopoly profits than in an unregulated sector. See R. Posner, Economic Analysis of
Law 497 & n.2 (3d ed. 1986); Douglas & Mullenix, supra, at 509-12; infra notes 199-200,
326-30 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Brennan, Local Government Action and Antitrust Policy: An Economic
Analysis, 12 Fordham Urb. L.J. 405, 413-15 (1984); Cirace, An Economic Analysis of the
"State-Municipal Action" Antitrust Cases, 61 Tex. L. Rev. 481, 490-96 (1982); Easter-
brook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L. & Econ. 23 (1983);
Hovenkamp & Mackerron, Municipal Regulation and Federal Antitrust Policy, 32 UCLA
L. Rev. 719, 768-74 (1985); Lopatka, State Action and Municipal Antitrust Immunity: An
Economic Approach, 53 Fordham L. Rev. 23, 54-55 (1984); Wiley, A Capture Theory of
Antitrust Federalism, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 713, 748-56 (1986).
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
10. See eg., Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 595-96 (1976); Jorde, Anti-
trust and the New State Action Doctrine" A Return to Deferential Economic Federalism,
75 Calif. L. Rev. 227, 227-29 (1987); Page, Antitrust, Federalism, and the Regulatory
Process. A Reconstruction and Critique of the State Action Exemption After Midcal Alu-
minum, 61 B.U.L. Rev. 1099, 1123 (1981); Wiley, supra note 8, at 748-56.
11. "Capture" is said to occur when a regulatory agency, supposedly established to
regulate a given industry in the public interest, falls under the influence of and benefits
the regulated industry at the expense of the public welfare. See Wiley, supra note 8, at
723-26; infra notes 326-28 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 329-30 and accompanying text.
13. See City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 404.
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discrimination, or conflict of interest." 4 Professor Wiley proposes deny-
ing immunity to state or local regulation that "restrains market rivalry"
and "does not respond directly to a substantial market inefficiency" if it
is "the product of capture in the sense that it originated from the decisive
political efforts of producers who stand to profit from its competitive re-
straint."' 5 Hovenkamp and MacKerron urge that the scope of immunity
for state and local regulation should depend only upon the federal court's
"determination of which unit of government is the optimal economic reg-
ulator in a certain market."' 6 Judge Easterbrook proposes to give immu-
nity to all state and local regulation, "so long as the residents of the state
that adopts the regulation also bear the whole monopoly overcharge.
1 7
These proposals all share an unfortunate disability: they rely on sub-
stantive criteria that the Supreme Court has conclusively rejected in de-
termining the scope of state action immunity. The Court briefly applied
substantive criteria over a decade ago,'" before adopting its exclusively
procedural paradigm. In applying this paradigm, the Court has refused
to consider the substantive merits of the design or performance of state
or local regulatory institutions' 9 or to make distinctions based on private
14. Cirace, supra note 8, at 498. An exception is made for displacement of competi-
tion by a public monopoly created and operated by the state government itself. In such
cases "the intent of the state legislation is almost certainly to benefit the public in general
as opposed to a narrow special interest." Id. at 497. Public monopolies operated by local
governments would not come within this exception. Id. at 497 n. 100; see Brennan, supra
note 8, at 406 n.6, 410-19.
15. Wiley, supra note 8, at 743; see id. at 745, 762-73. This test applies to regulation
not subject to an independent antitrust exemption. See id. at 745.
16. Hovenkamp & Mackerron, supra note 8, at 724; see id. at 774-77. The optimal
regulator, if entitled to regulate, "should be entitled to determine the nature and scope of
the regulation, subject only to preemption by an explicit federal regulatory statute." Id.
at 767-68.
17. Easterbrook, supra note 8, at 45; see id. at 49 ("if a state chooses to allow its
municipalities to export overcharges elsewhere within the state, it is hard to see why that
should be any concern of the antitrust laws"); Levmore, Interstate Exploitation and Judi-
cial Intervention, 69 Va. L. Rev. 563, 627 (1983) ("the state action exemption should be
reformulated to exclude circumstances ripe for interstate exploitation"). Professor Jorde,
who generally endorses the Supreme Court's procedural test, nonetheless recommends
denying immunity where state or local regulations impose substantial extraterritorial bur-
dens. See Jorde, supra note 10, at 253-56.
18. See, e.g., Cantor, 428 U.S. at 597 (immunity must be "necessary in order to make
the regulatory Act work, 'and even then only to the minimum extent necessary'" (quot-
ing Silver v., New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963))); Cantor, 428 U.S. at
610 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("state-sanctioned anticompetitive activity must fall like
any other if its potential harms outweigh its benefits"). In granting immunity to discipli-
nary rules of a state supreme court in Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977), the
Court suggested that it was important that such regulation was essential to "the State's
power to protect the public," id. at 361, and that attorney discipline was a traditional
subject of state regulation. See id. at 360-62; infra notes 65-72 and accompanying text.
19. For example, in Parker, state-sanctioned price supports for raisins imposed pursu-
ant to a California statute received immunity, although the impact of the price increases
fell largely on consumers outside California. The fact that the Court continues to treat
Parker as a paradigmatic example of state action meriting immunity, see, e.g., Southern
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control of, or influence over, regulatory decision making.2°
The Court's insistence on using exclusively procedural criteria for state
action immunity is now well-enough established to suggest that it will be
permanent. Given such a posture, a practical choice confronts those who
criticize the procedural test on efficiency grounds: whether to tinker with
the Court's procedural paradigm to make it more responsive to efficiency
concerns or to give up on efficiency goals in this area and yield to more
deferential solutions proposed in the name of federalism.2 If indeed the
critics are correct in their assessment that the procedural paradigm ut-
terly fails to advance antitrust's efficiency objectives, then, if substantive
criteria are impermissible, there would seem to be no reason not to read-
just the current balance greatly in favor of principles of federalism. 2
This Article advances a contrary argument: that the procedural para-
digm is capable of advancing antitrust's efficiency objectives to a worth-
while extent, albeit less than explicitly substantive criteria. Within the
constraints posed by the Court's procedural paradigm, this Article pro-
poses a more stringent version of the state policy requirement that would
deny immunity to much of the state and local regulation that is most
inefficient. This effort focuses on the Court's distinction between sover-
eign and nonsovereign policymaking. The distinction is meant to confineimmunity to restraints that implement policy of the "[s]tate acting as
sovereign,"23 giving only derivative immunity to agencies, local govern-
ments and regulated private parties.24 The proposed version of the state
policy requirement reinforces this distinction by requiring a much closer
fit than the current test requires between the expression of state policy
and nonsovereign regulation. If the Court intends to remain within the
Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 56-57, suggests that the Court will not consider extraterrito-
rial externalities to be a relevant factor. See Parker, 317 U.S. at 345.
Although the procedural paradigm effectively restricts the institutional mechanism
available to states for displacing competition, it does not otherwise put any outside limit
on the state's power to regulate or evaluate the impact of such regulation. See Southern
Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 56 & n.19, 57 n.21.
20. In Goldfarb the Court observed that the state bar association, a state agency,
"voluntarily joined in what is essentially a private anticompetitive activity, and in that
posture cannot claim it is beyond the reach of the Sherman Act." 421 U.S. at 792. In
Bates, however, the Court rejected the argument that "no immunity should result from
the bar's success in having the Code adopted by the State." 435 U.S. at 360. Further, in
City of Lafayette the Court declared, commenting on Goldfarb, that "the fact that the
ancillary effect of the State Bar's policy, or even the conscious desire on its part, may have
been to benefit the lawyers it regulated cannot transmute the State Bar's official actions
into those of a private organization." 435 U.S. at 411 n.41; see Town of Hallie, 471 U.S.
at 45 (city government, unlike private parties, can be presumed to function in the public
interest).
21. See, e.g., Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 69-70
(1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 434-41 (Stewart, J., dis-
senting); Garland, Antitrust and State Action: Economic Efficiency and the Political Pro-
cess, 96 Yale L.J. 486, 487-88 (1987); Handler, supra note 1, at 14-20.
22. See Wiley, supra note 8, at 739-40.
23. Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 60 (quoting Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 790).
24. See infra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
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confines of its current procedural paradigm, as seems likely, a reinvigo-
rated, nontrivial policy requirement may achieve a worthwhile degree of
efficiency nonetheless.
Part I provides a setting for this argument. It briefly introduces the
Supreme Court's state action doctrine and the doctrine's recent evolu-
tion, particularly that of the state policy requirement on which this Arti-
cle will concentrate. Part I emphasizes that when the Court speaks of
"state policy" in this context, it means a policy of the state legislature or
supreme court (the "sovereign" parts of state government), as opposed to
one of an agency or local government (the "nonsovereign" parts).25 De-
spite the clarity of the distinction, the Court's opinions demonstrate ex-
ceptional ambiguity as to the specificity with which a nonsovereign
restraint must correspond to sovereign policy. The Court has gone from
requiring that "the challenged restraint must be 'one clearly articulated
and affirmatively expressed as state policy' "26 to its current standard
that the policy element requires only a showing that the responsible sov-
ereign body "clearly intends to displace competition in a particular field
with a regulatory structure" (the "displacement-of-competition"
standard).27
Part I also considers the attacks on the Court's distinction between
sovereign and nonsovereign policymaking in the test for immunity. The
main criticisms are that the sovereign/nonsovereign distinction has no
basis in the Sherman Act, that it offends federalism, and that it is irrele-
vant to the Court's objectives. Although the Local Government Anti-
trust Act of 198428 is invoked freely in support of such criticisms, this
Part shows that this statute and its legislative history support, rather
than undercut, the Court's sovereign policymaking concept.29
In contrast to the evolving standard used to implement the state policy
requirement, the Court's apparent underlying objectives for the require-
ment have remained fairly stable. Part II identifies the Court's objectives
as confining immunity to restraints that implement sovereign policy,
while protecting the usefulness of cities and state agencies as instruments
of such policy.3" Evaluation of the displacement-of-competition standard
reveals its failure to achieve these objectives. Part II argues that the lax-
ity of the displacement-of-competition standard reflects an imprecise and
inaccurate concept of state policy, as the Court has used that term.3'
Accordingly, it gives immunity to nonsovereign restraints that cannot
plausibly be said to implement regulatory policy formulated by the sover-
25. See infra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
26. Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105 (quoting City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 410); see infra
notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
27. Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 64.
28. Pub. L. No. 98-544, 98 Stat. 2750 (1984) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 34-36 (Supp.
IV 1986)).
29. See infra notes 142-51, 161-63 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 183-87 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 196-215 and accompanying text.
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eign level of state government.32 Part II also demonstrates the inaccu-
racy of the Court's assertion that any version of the policy requirement
more exacting than the displacement-of-competition standard would dis-
rupt the functioning of agencies and local government as instruments of
state policy. 3
3
Part III proposes a version of the state policy requirement that serves
both of the Court's purposes. The proposed standard would give a non-
sovereign regulatory restraint immunity only when a sovereign-level part
of state government has affirmatively expressed a policy to displace com-
petition in the pertinent field in the form and magnitude presented by the
challenged restraint.' This version of the policy requirement protects
the flexibility of state and local government as tools of sovereign state
policy, while giving immunity only to nonsovereign restraints that imple-
ment sovereign state policy.
This standard would leave agencies and local government with consid-
erable freedom of action, while confining antitrust immunity to restraints
that, in a meaningful sense, implement an affirmative policy of the
state.35 Applying this standard to the cases decided by the Court yields
results consistent with virtually all of the results in the Court's opinions,
thus addressing the Court's concern for maintaining continuity in this
area. 36 Last, because such a standard would tend to deny immunity to
some of the most inefficient state and local regulation, its impact on so-
cial welfare would be substantially superior to that of the existing
standard. 3
7
I. DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT
A. Overview
The modern state action antitrust doctrine originated with the
Supreme Court's opinion in Parker v. Brown in 1943.38 Under a Califor-
nia statute, the state Agricultural Prorate Advisory Commission ap-
proved a program of marketing controls for Raisin Proration Zone No.
1, according to which all raisins grown in that zone-virtually all of the
raisins consumed in America-had to be delivered to the program com-
mittee for grading and allocation into pools.39 The committee variously
performed or controlled the marketing of the subject crop, effectively de-
termining the timing and volume of all sales and, to a large extent, the
price.' An affected raisin grower brought an antitrust action against the
32. See infra note 216 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 257-63 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 266-74 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 280-88 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 291-325 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 326-52 and accompanying text.
38. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
39. Id at 347-48.
40, Id at 346.
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state's Director of Agriculture, the Commission, the Raisin Proration
Zone, and the program committee. 41 The Supreme Court held that the
Sherman Act did not prohibit these marketing controls.42
Not surprisingly, interpretations of Parker v. Brown have varied
widely. The opinion identified a category of conduct that is immune
from the Sherman Act43 and determined that the marketing program of
Raisin Proration Zone No. 1 fell within this category, but otherwise pro-
vided little guidance. Certain language in Parker suggests that any con-
duct of any part of state government constitutes state action." Overall,
however, the opinion suggests that the administrative supervision of the
growers and the involvement of the legislature were critical to the
Court's holding, indicating a much more qualified definition of state ac-
tion.45 The opinion's ambiguity indeed suggests that the Court was not
41. Id. at 344.
42. See id. at 350-52.
43. The category is "state action," or more precisely, "state action or official action
directed by a state." Id. at 351; cf City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435
U.S. 389, 411-12 (1978) (plurality opinion).
44. See, e.g., Parker, 317 U.S. at 352 ("prohibition of individual and not state ac-
tion"). One interpretation of Parker is that all non-"private" action is state action qualify-
ing for immunity. See City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 429 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (Parker
distinguished between "private action and governmental action," not between "actions of
a state legislature and those of other governmental units."); Jorde, supra note 10, at 229
(construing Parker as applying Sherman Act only to private parties). Professor Wiley
interprets Parker even more broadly, finding in Parker a states' rights premise of no pre-
emption, even in circumstances where the state simply authorizes anticompetitive con-
duct without any regulatory supervision. See Wiley, supra note 8, at 717-23; cf. Page,
supra note 10, at 1127-28 (supervision requirement inconsistent with Parker).
45. Taking the view that Parker stands for giving immunity to all non-private action,
however, renders other statements in the opinion surplusage. First, the opinion distin-
guishes between "a state" and "its officers and agents," and between "state action" and
"official action directed by a state." 317 U.S. at 350-51. Second, the opinion states that
the Sherman Act was not intended to "restrain a state or its officers or agents from activi-
ties directed by its legislature," 317 U.S. at 350-51 (emphasis added), or to "restrain state
action or official action directed by a state," id. at 351 (emphasis added). Third,%'he
opinion emphasizes how the pertinent actions of the agency followed and fit the legisla-
tive policy. The marketing program "derived its authority and its efficacy from the legis-
lative command." Id. at 350. The statute was a "state command to the Commission and
to the program committee." Id. at 352. "The state itself exercises its legislative authority
in making the regulation and in prescribing the conditions of its application." Id. The
"state ... as sovereign, imposed the restraint as an act of government." Id.
These remarks, taken together, suggest that the pronounced legislative role in Parker
was essential, rather than incidental, to the Court's rationale. See Town of Hallie v. City
of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 38 (1985) (Parker "refused to construe the Sherman Act as
applying to the anticompetitive conduct of a State acting through its legislature"); City of
Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 412 (plurality opinion) (Parker limited immunity to "'official ac-
tion directed by a state'" (quoting Parker, 317 U.S. at 351)); Cantor v. Detroit Edison
Co., 428 U.S. 579, 591 (1976) (Parker contains "carefully selected language ivhich plainly
limited the Court's holding to official action taken by state officials").
Parker asserts that a state "does not give immunity to those who violate the Sherman
Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their action is lawful." 317
U.S. at 351. Professor Wiley views this statement as "antitrust federalism's first sugges-
tion of a doctrinally restricted definition of 'state' policy," Wiley, supra note 8, at 730,
and as inconsistent with "Parker's premise of deferring to state and local decisionmak-
ANTITR UST IMMUNITY
trying to state a conclusive, detailed rule, but only trying to define the
concept of state action antitrust immunity to the limited extent necessary
to resolve the case before it.' The particular indeterminacy of Parker is
illustrated by the fact that the Court, in its varied approaches to the state
action issue, uniformly has claimed to be acting consistently with
Parker.47 The Court still treats this vague opinion, over forty years later,
as the "starting point in any analysis involving the state action
doctrine."48
The Court did not elaborate substantially on the state action doctrine
until over thirty years later, in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar.a9 There,
state and county bar associations sought immunity for an advisory mini-
mum fee schedule issued by the county bar and patterned after the state
bar's fee schedule, which was indirectly enforced by the state bar's ethi-
cal pronouncements regarding fee-setting." In denying immunity, the
Court cited Parker for the proposition that "[tihe threshold inquiry in
determining if an anticompetitive activity is state action of the type the
Sherman Act was not meant to proscribe is whether the activity is re-
quired by the State acting as sovereign."51 The state supreme court con-
ing." Id. Instead of identifying an unqualified states' rights premise in Parker that is
contradicted within the same opinion, however, it makes more sense to infer from the
context that no such unqualified premise was intended, especially when this purported
premise was "[s]urprisingly" ignored by two succeeding opinions, id. at 720, and "tram-
ple[d]" by the rest of the Court's opinions. Id at 722; see 1 P. Areeda & D. Turner,
Antitrust Law % 213, at 71-79 (1978) (regulatory supervision essential to result in
Parker); Patrick v. Burget, 108 S. Ct. 1658 (1988) (same).
Furthermore, dictum in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n. undercuts
the view that a supervision requirement is inconsistent with Parker. 322 U.S. 533, 542
(1944). There the Court, in determining that the insurance business fell within the reach
of the Sherman Act, considered the argument that this would disrupt existing state regu-
lation: "The argument that the Sherman Act necessarily invalidates many state laws
regulating insurance we regard as exaggerated. Few states go so far as to permit private
insurance companies, without state supervision, to agree upon and fix uniform insurance
rates." 322 U.S. at 562 (emphasis added) (citing Parker, 317 U.S. at 350-52).
46. See 1 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 45, 212c, at 70.
47. See, e.g., Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference v. United States, 471 U.S. 48,
56-57 (1985); Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 38-39; Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 567-69
(1984); Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 54 (1982);
California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 104-06
(1980); City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 408-17 (plurality opinion); Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 359 (1977); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 790-92
(1975); cf Cantor, 428 U.S. at 591-92 (plurality opinion) (Parker applies only to state
defendants, not private ones.).
48. Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 38; Hoover, 466 U.S. at 567.
49. 421 U.S. 773 (1975). In Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S.
384 (1951), the Court stated that "when a state compels retailers to follow a parallel price
policy, it demands private conduct which the Sherman Act forbids." Id. at 389 (citing
Parker, 317 U.S. at 350). In Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370
U.S. 690 (1962), the Court applied Parker, but with no further elucidation of the test for
immunity. Id at 706.
50. See Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 778 n.6, 782-83, 791 n.21.
51. Id at 790 (citing Parker, 317 U.S. at 350-52 and Continental Ore Co., 370 U.S. at
706-07).
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stituted the state acting as sovereign in this context.52 The state bar
association was a state agency but did not share this sovereign status; its
actions did not qualify for immunity any more than those of the county
bar association because they were not compelled by the supreme court.53
This distinction between sovereign and nonsovereign parts of govern-
ment has endured as a fundamental part of the Court's analysis. The
actions of the legislature and supreme court, each an "ultimate body
wielding the State's power" in its respective sphere, 54 are regarded as
those of "the State itself,"'55 "the State as sovereign," 56 and "the sover-
eign itself."57 In contrast, the state's subordinate bodies, such as state
agencies and local government, are nonsovereign. 58
Parker suggests an essentially procedural inquiry into what actions of
state government constitute "state action or official action directed by a
state."5 9 Goldfarb defines the compulsion requirement as a threshold cri-
terion of state action, but does not explore what further criteria might
apply if that threshold were attained.' The Court's next two opinions,
however, explicitly identify substantive, as well as procedural, factors
bearing on immunity.
In Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.,61 a private utility regulated by a state
public service commission sought immunity.62 A plurality held that be-
cause the case did not "call into question the legality of any act of the
State of Michigan or any of its officials or agents," it was not controlled
by Parker;6 3 immunity would depend on the same test applied to claims
of immunity based on federal regulation: whether "exemption was nec-
essary . . . to make the regulatory Act work.""
In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,65 the Court reaffirmed the Goldfarb
sovereign compulsion requirement in granting immunity to a disciplinary
52. See id. at 790-92. The Court also observed that the legislature had "authorized its
highest court to regulate the practice of law." Id. at 789.
53. See id. at 790-92.
54. Bates, 433 U.S. at 360.
55. Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 63.
56. Id. at 64 (citing Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 790) (emphasis omitted).
57. Hoover, 466 U.S. at 569.
58. See id. at 568-69 (citing City of Boulder, 455 U.S. at 54).
59. Parker, 317 U.S. at 351. That is, Parker focused on who approved and imple-
mented the challenged restraint, rather than on the impact, merits or traditional status of
the restraint.
60. See Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 790-92.
61. 428 U.S. 579 (1976) (plurality opinion).
62. See id. at 582-83. At issue was the utility's program of providing lightbulbs to
consumers at cost. See id. at 581-82. Because this program was set forth in a tariff
approved by the commission, it was binding on the utility. See id.
63. Id. at 591-92; see Bates, 433 U.S. at 361 & n.13. The Court has since tacitly
rejected this distinction. See infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
64. Cantor, 428 U.S. at 597. The Court has reexplained denial of immunity in Cantor
by the fact that "the Michigan Legislature had indicated no intention to displace compe-
tition in the relevant market." Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 64.
65. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
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rule forbidding advertising by attorneys.66 The rule had been proposed
by the state bar association, but once adopted, it became "the affirmative
command of the Arizona Supreme Court... the ultimate body wielding
the State's power over the practice of law"'67 and was thus "'compelled
by direction of the State acting as a sovereign.' ,68 The Court also sug-
gested additional criteria for Parker v. Brown immunity: the regulation
was essential to "the State's power to protect the public;"'69 the practice
of law was a traditional subject of state regulation;'0 and the state
supreme court's policy was "clearly and affirmatively expressed" and its
"supervision" of the state bar was "active."" The substantive criteria for
state action immunity identified in Cantor and Bates warrant greater dis-
placement of state regulatory autonomy than any other version of the
Court's test for immunity. 2
The Court's retreat from such intrusive scrutiny began in City of La-
fayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co. 73 in 1978. Since then, the Court
has expressed the test for state action immunity in purely procedural
terms, looking to a restraint's institutional pedigree rather than to its
substantive merits.' 4 In California Retail Liquor Dealers Association v.
MidcalAluminum, Inc,' 5 the Court expressed this procedural test in the
two-part paradigm that since has governed, in some form, the Court's
immunity analysis: "First, the challenged restraint must be 'one clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy'; second, the policy
must be 'actively supervised' by the State itself.'7 6 The Court's most
66. See id at 360-63. The Court summarized Parker as holding that "the Sherman
Act was not intended to apply against certain state action." Id at 359 (emphasis added).
67. Id at 360.
68. Id (quoting Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 791).
69. Id at 361; see id at 360 n. 11 (denying immunity in that case would have "unde-
sired effect" of diminishing state's authority to regulate professions).
70. See id at 362.
71. Id. The Arizona state bar seems to have been constituted as a state agency under
the supervision of the supreme court, see id at 353 n.3, as in Goldfarb. See 421 U.S. at
776 n.2.
72. Professor Wiley asserts that since the 1970's, the Court's state action cases have
"intruded more and more on state and local regulatory policy." Wiley, supra note 8, at
714; see id at 728. The Court's opinions in Goldfarb, Cantor and Bates roughly fit this
pattern, but City of Lafayette inaugurates an exclusively procedural test, and the Court's
application of this test has become increasingly lax. See infra notes 85-89, 174-76 and
accompanying text. At the same time, City of Lafayette, as the Court's first application of
the antitrust laws to cities, may seem to mark an expanded intrusion. Its rationale, how-
ever, fits within the sovereign/nonsovereign parameters established by the Court in Gold-
farb and Bates. See supra notes 51-58, 67 and accompanying text; infra notes 79-84 and
accompanying text.
73. 435 U.S. 389 (1978) (plurality opinion).
74. The Court has since expressly renounced inquiry into the necessity for challenged
state regulation. See Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 57 n.21. This and other cases
applying exclusively procedural criteria are discussed individually in the following sec-
tion. See infra notes 101-136 and accompanying text.
75. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
76. Id at 105 (citing City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 410 (plurality opinion)). See gen-
erally P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law 212.1-212.9 (Supp. 1987).
1988]
546 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56
recent cases have reaffirmed the Midcal test as the proper approach to
state action analysis, 7 whether the defendant is a part of state or local
government or a private party regulated by state or local government.78
The Court's use of the term "state policy" in the policy requirement
carries a specialized meaning. State policy means policy set by one of the
sovereign parts of state government, as opposed to a nonsovereign part.79
Conduct that is "in fact that of the state legislature or supreme court"8 °
is deemed, without further inquiry, to represent state policy and to satisfy
that criterion for immunity.8" The policy element of the Midcal test be-
77. See 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 107 S. Ct. 720, 725 (1987) (quoting Midcal, 445
U.S. at 105); Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 57 (quoting Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105);
Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 39 (referring to the City of Lafayette "two-pronged test").
78. See Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 56-57; see, e.g., Town of Hallie, 471 U.S.
at 38; Cantor, 428 U.S. at 591-92.
A related doctrine is that of "preemption." In Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260
(1986), the appellant landlords argued that a city rent-control ordinance constituted a
price-fixing violation under the Sherman Act. Id. at 265. The Court held that irreconcil-
able conflict between the state or local legislation and the antitrust laws, an established
condition of preemption, required a showing of concerted action, and that without this
showing, it was not necessary for the government defendant to show it was entitled to
state action immunity. Id. at 264-70. The Berkeley ordinance was not preempted be-
cause there was no showing of concerted action between the city and the landlords. Id. at
269-70. The Court also noted, however, that some apparently unilateral government reg-
ulations may constitute "hybrid" restraints, in which regulatory "nonmarket mechanisms
merely enforce private marketing decisions." Id. at 267-68.
It is not clear how much the preemption doctrine, so explained, alters the state action
doctrine. Compare id. at 274-76 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Fisher "discards" conventional
state action doctrine) and Gifford, The Antitrust State-Action Doctrine After Fisher v.
Berkeley, 39 Vand. L. Rev. 1257, 1281-86 (1986) (Fisher substantially alters prior state
action doctrine) with Garland, supra note 21, at 503-07 (the preemption and state action
tests ultimately converge); see also Wiley, The Berkeley Rent Control Case: Treating Vic-
tims as Villains, 1986 Sup. Ct. Rev. 157 (offers two explanations for Court's "apparent
nonsense"). This article addresses only the conventional subject matter of the state ac-
tion doctrine, without attempting to predict what inroads on its scope the preemption
doctrine may effect.
79. See, e.g., Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 63-64; Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at
38-39; Hoover, 466 U.S. at 569-70; City of Boulder, 455 U.S. at 50-52. The word "state"
has two different meanings in the Midcal test: state policy must come from a "sovereign"
part of the state government, but "state" supervision does not have to be conducted by a
"sovereign" part of the state government. See infra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
It is the supervision requirement that has changed in this respect, however, not the policy
requirement. The language of both the policy and supervision requirements derives from
Bates, 433 U.S. at 362, where it was the state supreme court that expressed the policy and
supervised the pertinent conduct of the state bar. The supreme court, being "the ultimate
body wielding the State's power" over the field in question, constituted " 'the State acting
as a sovereign.'" Id. at 360 (quoting Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 791).
80. See Hoover, 466 U.S. at 568-69.
81. The actions of the legislature and supreme court are regarded as those of "the
State itself," Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 63, "the State as sovereign," id. at 64
(emphasis in original) (citing Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 790); see Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 790
(citing Parker, 317 U.S. at 350-52 and Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon
Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 706-07 (1962)), and "the sovereign itself." Hoover, 466 U.S. at 569.
A state supreme court's actions have sovereign status when it is "acting legislatively
rather than judicially." Id. at 568. The Court has reserved the question of whether "the
Governor of a State stands in the same position as the state legislature and supreme court
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comes an issue only if the pertinent anticompetitive government conduct
is that of a "nonsovereign state representative" 82-a "state instrumental-
ity,"' 83 such as an agency or local government. These "representatives"
must be shown to be implementing state policy-policy of the legislature
or supreme court. The Court's state action doctrine thus reflects defer-
ence to the legislative judgment of the sovereign states; its application to
agencies and cities is only derivative.8"
The Court gradually has refined various aspects of the Midcal two-part
procedural paradigm in ways that simplify and ease the requirements for
immunity. The Court now construes the Midcal policy requirement as a
displacement-of-competition standard, which is satisfied "[a]s long as the
State as sovereign clearly intends to displace competition in a particular
field with a regulatory structure." 85 It is not necessary for immunity that
a legislature "expressly state in a statute or its legislative history that it
intends for the delegated action to have anticompetitive effects."86 It is
not sufficient, however, merely to show that a regulatory restraint is law-
ful under state law.87 Although Goldfarb indicated that immunity de-
pended on compulsion by the state legislature or supreme court of the
challenged conduct of nonsovereign parts of state government or of pri-
vate parties, 8 the Court now disclaims ever having required this; cur-
for purposes of the state-action doctrine." Id at 568 n. 17; cf Deak-Perera Hawaii, Inc.
v. Department of Transp., 745 F.2d 1281, 1282 (9th Cir. 1984) (Parker doctrine applica-
ble to state executive branch action), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1053 (1985); Jorde, supra note
10, at 241 n.89 (state governor should receive ipso facto immunity, but executive agencies
should be treated like legislative agencies); Lopatka, The State of "State Action "Antitrust
Immunity: A Progress Report, 46 La. L. Rev. 941, 1040 (1986) (executive branch action
should be immune if within powers defined by state Constitution).
82. Hoover, 466 U.S. at 569 (citing City of Boulder, 455 U.S. at 54).
83. City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 411 n.41 (plurality opinion); see id at 417.
84. See, e.g., Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260, 263 (1986) ("The ultimate
source of [state action] immunity can be only the State, not its subdivisions"); Hoover,
466 U.S. at 567 (Parker, using "principles of federalism and state sovereignty .... de-
clined to construe the Sherman Act as prohibiting the anti-competitive actions of a State
acting through its legislature"); City of Boulder, 455 U.S. at 50 ("the Parker exemption
reflects the federalism principle that we are a Nation of States, a principle that makes no
accommodation for sovereign subdivisions of States") (emphasis in original); infra notes
180-86 and accompanying text.
85. Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 64; See Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 44; infra
notes 133-36 and accompanying text.
86. Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 43.
87. See City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 414 n.44, 415 n.45 (plurality opinion).
88. In Goldfarb the Court stated that the "threshold inquiry" in state action cases
was "whether the activity is required by the State acting as sovereign." 421 U.S. at 790.
The Court denied immunity for restraints efflected by a state agency (the state bar) and a
private group (the county bar association) because the state supreme court had not "re-
quired the anticompetitive activities of either respondent." Id. In Bates, granting immu-
nity, the Court stated that the challenged restraint, a disciplinary rule, was "the
affirmative command of the Arizona Supreme Court" and that "the restraint is 'com-
pelled by direction of the State acting as a sovereign.'" 433 U.S. at 360; see City of
Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 411 n.41 (plurality opinion) ("anticompetitive actions of a state
instrumentality not compelled by the State acting as sovereign are not immune from the
antitrust laws").
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rently, the state policy relied on for immunity may be permissive rather
than mandatory.89
The other half of the Midcal test, the active supervision requirement,
does not apply where "the actor is a municipality." 90 Although the
Court has hesitated to say so,9 the supervision requirement also would
seem to be a dead letter as applied to agency conduct. 92 In contrast, a
private defendant seeking immunity still must show that its pertinent an-
ticompetitive conduct has received active governmental supervision.93
Thus, it seems the active supervision requirement now applies only to
private conduct. What facts are necessary to satisfy this prong, however,
89. See Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 59-61. The Court stated that compul-
sion had not been an issue in Goldfarb because the state bar had "compelled Fairfax
County lawyers to adhere to a minimum-fee schedule." Id. at 60. In fact, however, no
such compulsion existed. The fee schedule was formally advisory, and although the ac-
tions by the state bar comprised "a substantial influencing factor," Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at
778 n.6, the Court found that "the desire of attorneys to comply with announced profes-
sional norms," id. at 781, and "the assurance that other lawyers would not compete by
underbidding," id. at 782, were other "factors" that "coalesced" to produce adherence to
the fee schedules. Id. at 783.
90. Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 46. It will not be required that the legislature super-
vise a municipality's anticompetitive conduct. As the Court noted, application of this
requirement to cities was suggested by the City of Lafayette plurality. Id.; see City of
Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 410. In City of Boulder, the Court expressly left undecided whether
the active supervision requirement should apply to municipal conduct. See 455 U.S. at 51
n.14.
91. See Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 46 n.10 (where "the actor is a state agency, it is
likely that active state supervision [of the agency] would ... not be required, although we
do not here decide that issue").
92. See P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, supra note 76, % 212.7, at 144; Jorde, supra note
10, at 245; Lopatka, supra note 81, at 1040-41.
Several earlier opinions suggest that the activities of agencies must be supervised by the
legislature or supreme court to qualify for immunity. In Goldfarb the Court observed
that although the state bar apparently was authorized to issue opinions interpreting disci-
plinary rules, it was not shown "that the Virginia Supreme Court approves the opinions."
421 U.S. at 791. In Bates, holding a disciplinary rule immune, the Court emphasized that
the state bar performed its part in enforcing the rules under the "continuous supervision"
of the supreme court. 433 U.S. at 361. In Hoover, the Court noted that it had "found the
degree to which the state legislature or supreme court supervises its representative to be
relevant to the inquiry." 466 U.S. at 569.
However, this purported requirement was not even mentioned in Southern Motor Car-
riers, and it does not appear in that case that there was any legislative supervision of the
respective public service commissions. See 471 U.S. at 51. Nor did the Court mention a
requirement of legislative supervision of the respective agencies in Midcal, 445 U.S. at
105-06, or in 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 107 S. Ct. 720, 725-26 (1987). In Parker itself,
which the Court has.always treated as an archetypal case of immune state action, the
restraint "derived its authority and its efficacy from the legislative command of the state,"
317 U.S. at 350, but there was no suggestion that the legislature supervised the work of
the state Agricultural Prorate Advisory Commission. See id. at 345-48.
The Court's rationale for relieving local government of this form of scrutiny, whether
persuasive or not, would also seem to apply to state agencies, although perhaps to a lesser
degree. See Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 45 & n.9 (municipality may be presumed to act in
the public interest, unlike private party, because of greater likelihood of exposure to pub-
lic scrutiny).
93. See id. at 46 n.10.
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remains unclear. The Court has never defined the minimum threshold
constituting active supervision, but a token degree of supervision seems
to suffice.94
B. The State Policy Requirement. A Study in Ambivalence
The policy requirement proposed in this Article essentially revives and
clarifies the Midcal version." While the Court itself emphatically claims
to be following Midcal,96 the cases demonstrate the duality in the Court's
development of the state policy requirement. Although since City of La-
fayette the Court repeatedly has required a clear and affirmative expres-
sion of state policy,9 7 it has wavered between two main, alternative
versions of what satisfies this requirement. The stricter standard, articu-
lated in Midcal, requires that the challenged restraint itself must identifi-
ably implement state policy;9" the other, the displacement-of-competition
standard, is satisfied by a state policy to displace competition with regu-
94. In Southern Motor Carriers, where it was deemed established that the common
carriers' rate-making activities were actively supervised by the respective states, 471 U.S.
at 62, the filed rates automatically took effect if the commission did not act within a
specified period of time. See iL at 50-51; see also Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 46 ("the
requirement of active state supervision serves essentially an evidentiary function: it is one
way of ensuring that the actor is engaging in the challenged conduct pursuant to state
policy").
The Court's standard thus seems to approximate that proposed by Professors Areeda
and Turner, who argue that as long as state agencies act within their authority, the court
should not "scrutinize the rigor with which the state supervises the challenged activity to
ensure that supervision is more than pro forma." 1 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note
45, % 213c, at 75. The antitrust court should "accept the state's apparent supervision on
its face. There simply is no way to tell if the state has 'looked' hard enough at the data
.... [A]n allegation that state officials customarily 'rubber stamp' the self-interested
decisions or recommendations of the private parties involved should not ordinarily oust
Parker immunity." l; cf. Garland, supra note 21, at 501 ("The supervision requirement
ensures that even where there is state authorization, such authorization constitutes more
than mere permission to violate the Sherman Act."). Areeda and Turner would deny
immunity, however, where government supervision of private conduct consists merely of
agency inaction on private proposals. 1 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 45, 1 213f, at
77-79.
Midcal suggests a stricter supervision requirement. There the Court held that the
state's resale price maintenance and price posting program for the wholesale wine market
was not actively supervised by the state. 445 U.S. at 105-06. The Court observed that the
statute "simply authorizes price setting and enforces the prices established by private
parties" and that the state did not establish the prices, review their reasonableness, regu-
late the terms of the fair trade contracts, monitor market conditions or "engage in any
'pointed reexamination' of the program." Id. The Court, however, did not specify a
requisite minimum degree of supervision. The Court also found a lack of active supervi-
sion in 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 107 S. Ct. 720, 729 (1987). In Patrick v. Burget, 108
S. Ct. 1658, 1663-66 (1988), the Court held that, to satisfy the supervision requirement,
state officials must have and exercise power to review private anticompetitive actions.
95. See infra notes 266-78 and accompanying text.
96. E.g., Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 58, 62.
97. Kg., City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 410 (plurality opinion); Southern Motor Carri-
ers, 471 U.S. at 57; 324 Liquor Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 725.
98. See Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105.
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lation in that field.99 The Court finally avoided choosing between these
alternatives by asserting that the latter satisfies the former."
City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co. o foreshadows the
major developments in the policy requirement. It establishes analysis of
immunity in purely procedural terms and contains language from which
the Court subsequently fashioned the familiar two-part test in Midcal. 0 2
It defines the outer boundaries of the policy requirement: "specific, de-
tailed legislative authorization" is not necessary," 3 but mere lawfulness
under state law will not suffice." Most important, the plurality and dis-
senting opinions in City of Lafayette openly confront the issue of how
specifically state policy must comprehend the challenged restraint' 05-an
issue that often has been obscured in subsequent opinions. 10 6 On this
point, moreover, the plurality opinion corresponds to the later Midcal
version of the policy requirement, while the dissenting opinions corre-
spond to the displacement-of-competition version;10 7 the Court now as-
serts that these two versions are equivalent.108
In City of Lafayette, the plurality conceded that "the actions of munic-
ipalities may reflect state policy, '"1"9 but it declined to grant immunity
simply because municipal conduct was engaged in "pursuant to state pol-
icy to displace competition with regulation or monopoly public ser-
vice.,, 0 The plurality feared that such a general standard", would give
immunity to actions that reflected merely municipal, as opposed to state,
99. See Hoover, 466 U.S. at 569; City of Boulder, 455 U.S. at 51; New Motor Vehicle
Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 109 (1978).
100. Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 64-65; see infra notes 133-35 and accompa-
nying text.
101. 435 U.S. 389 (1978). The state action issue in City of Lafayette was raised by two
municipalities operating electric utilities. State law authorized municipal operation of
utilities, but did not otherwise address the exclusionary conduct alleged. See id. at 392
n.6; id. at 403-05 (plurality opinion). The cities argued that by virtue of their governmen-
tal status, their actions necessarily constituted state action within the scope of Parker
immunity. See id. at 408. A plurality of the Court denied immunity. Id.
102. See id. at 410. The state policy and active supervision language is derived from
Bates, 433 U.S. at 362. Bates, however, also contains other criteria. See supra notes 67-
70 and accompanying text.
103. See City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 415 (plurality opinion); accord Southern Motor
Carriers, 471 U.S. at 64.
104. See City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 414 n.44, 415 n.45 (plurality opinion).
105. See id. at 413-14, 416; id. at 426-27 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
106. See infra notes 116-32 and accompanying text.
107. See infra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
108. See infra notes 133-36 and accompanying text.
109. City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 413 (plurality opinion).
110. Id.
111. The rejected standard is effectively equivalent to the displacement-of-competition
standard now used. The phrase "pursuant to" might be taken to suggest a more precise
connection between the restraint and the state policy than the Southern Motor Carriers
displacement-of-competition standard, which is satisfied if a sovereign branch of govern-
ment "clearly intends to displace competition in a particular field with a regulatory struc-
ture." 471 U.S. at 64. Southern Motor Carriers, however, also uses the phrase "pursuant
to" in referring to the policy requirement, id. at 65, and the context of the opinion makes
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policy. 112 Instead, to restrict immunity to municipal conduct "directed
or authorized" by the legislature," 3 the plurality held that "an adequate
state mandate for anticompetitive activities of cities and other
subordinate governmental units exists when it is found 'from the author-
ity given a governmental entity to operate in a particular area, that the
legislature contemplated the kind of action complained of.' " " This test
is far more concrete than the rejected alternative; like the later Midcal
test, it makes a court relate the nonsovereign body's actual conduct to
state policy, not just find that it took place within a field chosen for
regulation. 15
In its next state action case, New Motor Vehicle Board of California v.
Orrin W. Fox Co.," 6 the Court ignored the City of Lafayette test. In
granting immunity, the Court chose language functionally equivalent to
the displacement-of-competition test it had rejected in City of Lafay-
ette:" 7 it was "dispositive" that "the [controlling statute's] regulatory
clear that no such qualifying effect is intended. The same is true of Town of Hallie. See
infra note 136.
112. See City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 414 (plurality opinion). Regulation imposed by
local governments might represent "economic choices counseled solely by their own pa-
rochial interests" rather than state policy, especially in light of their role as "owners and
providers of services... fully capable of aggrandizing other economic units with which
they interrelate." Id. at 408. Such a broad rule of immunity "would impair the goals
Congress sought to achieve by [the antitrust] laws ...without furthering the policy
underlying the Parker 'exemption.'" Id. at 415.
113. See id at 416. The plurality declared that without "evidence that the State au-
thorized or directed a given municipality to act as it did, the actions of a particular city
hardly can be found to be pursuant to 'the state['s] command,' or to be restraints that 'the
state.., as sovereign' imposed." Id at 414 (quoting Parker, 317 U.S. at 352); see id. at
410 ("for purposes of the Parker doctrine, not every act of a state agency is that of the
State as sovereign") (citing Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 790, 792
(1975)).
114. 435 U.S. at 415 (quoting opinion below, 532 F.2d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 1976)); cf id.
at 425 n.6 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (requiring the cities to prove "that the exemption
was not only part of a regulatory scheme to supersede competition, but that it was essen-
tial to the state's plan" (emphasis in original)).
115. See infra note 123. Thus, Town of Hallie's reference to a "suggestion" in City of
Lafayette "that a municipality must show more than that a state policy to displace com-
petition exists," 471 U.S. at 40, is misleading. This was not merely a suggestion, but an
explicit point in the plurality opinion. Compare City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 408-17
(plurality opinion) (Parker does not exempt all governmental agencies simply by reason
of their status as such; state legislative mandate for relevant anticompetitive activities
must be proven) with id at 426 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (Parker applies because petition-
ers are governmental bodies, not private persons, and their actions are acts of
government).
116. 439 U.S. 96 (1978). The New Motor Vehicle Board was a state agency consti-
tuted under a statute requiring the board's approval prior to establishment or relocation
of automobile dealerships within the market area of an existing franchise, if the latter
protested. See id at 98 & n.1. The agency's challenged action-advising the manufac-
turer of this requirement and noticing a hearing-was taken pursuant to this statute. See
id; infra note 293.
117. See 435 U.S. at 413 (plurality opinion) (that the city had acted "pursuant to state
policy to displace competition with regulation or monopoly public service" held
insufficient).
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scheme is a system of regulation, clearly articulated and affirmatively ex-
pressed, designed to displace unfettered business freedom in the matter of
the establishment and relocation of automobile dealerships." '118 This
summary ignores the extra condition, imposed by City of Lafayette, that
the legislature must have contemplated the kind of action in issue.1 19
In California Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal Aluminum,
Inc., 2° the unanimous Court distilled from its previous opinions the now
familiar two-part test121 and denied immunity because of the lack of "ac-
tive supervision" of market participants by government regulators. 122 In
defining the policy requirement, the Court shifted back towards the
stricter formulation set out in City of Lafayette,123 stating that "the chal-
lenged restraint must be 'one clearly articulated and affirmatively ex-
pressed as state policy.' "124
Although Midcal was a unanimous decision and since 1985 has been
invoked by the Court as the governing standard, 125 the Court's next two
opinions fail to treat it as such. In Community Communications Co. v.
118. 439 U.S. at 109.
119. See 435 U.S. at 415; supra note 114 and accompanying text.
120. 445 U.S. 97 (1980). A wine wholesaler brought suit challenging a state statute
that required wholesalers to sell at prices designated in either a fair trade contract or a
price schedule filed with the state. See id. at 99-100.
121. "First, the challenged restraint must be 'one clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed as state policy'; second, the policy must be 'actively supervised' by the State
itself." Id. at 105 (quoting City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 410 (plurality opinion)).
122. 445 U.S. at 105-06.
123. City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 415 (plurality opinion); see Town of Halie, 471 U.S.
at 39 (Midcal "applied the Lafayette two-pronged test"); City of Boulder, 455 U.S. at 51
n. 14 (Midcal "explicitly adopted the principle, expressed in the plurality opinion in City
of Lafayette, that anticompetitive restraints engaged in by state municipalities or subdivi-
sions must be 'clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy' in order to
gain an antitrust exemption") (citing Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105).
Like City of Lafayette, Midcal focuses the policy inquiry on the type of restraint
presented, not merely on the existence of a regulatory system. Both instruct courts to
relate the nonsovereign body's actual conduct to prior state policy, not just to find that it
took place within a field chosen for regulation. Midcal says that "the restraint" must be
expressed as state policy. See Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105; City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 415
(plurality opinion). Taken together with the premise that "specific, detailed legislative
authorization is not required," City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 415 (plurality opinion),
however, Midcal really refers to a type of regulation, Mideal, 445 U.S. at 105, like the
"kind of action" which City of Lafayette says must be "contemplated." 435 U.S. at 415
(plurality opinion).
That the two cases stand for essentially equivalent versions of the policy requirement is
indicated by the parallels in the opinions. City of Lafayette analogizes cities to state agen-
cies, see 435 U.S. at 410 & n.40 (plurality opinion), id. at 412 n.42; Midcal, a state agency
case, in turn cites City of Lafayette as authority for its policy requirement. 445 U.S. at
105. The Midcal policy language is taken directly from the City of Lafayette plurality
opinion. Compare Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105 ("the challenged restraint must be 'one clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy' ") with City of Lafayette, 435 U.S.
at 410 (plurality opinion) ("the state policy requiring the anticompetitive restraint ... was
one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy" (emphasis added)).
124. Id. at 105 (quoting City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 410 (plurality opinion)).
125. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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City of Boulder,126 the Court's summary and application of the policy
standard was ambiguous. The Court painstakingly mischaracterized City
of Lafayette as extending immunity to any municipal conduct engaged in
"'pursuant to state policy to displace competition with regulation or mo-
nopoly public service,' "127 and claimed that this truncated version of the
City of Lafayette holding had been adopted in Midcal.28 In places, how-
ever, it also seemed to acknowledge the more restrictive version of the
policy requirement. The Court remarked, for example, that "[a] state
that allows its municipalities to do as they please can hardly be said to
have 'contemplated' the specific anticompetitive actions for which mu-
nicipal liability is sought." '12 9 In Hoover v. Ronwin,'30 the Court's reca-
pitulation of the case law confirmed the displacement-of-competition
standard as interpreted in City of Boulder.13 1
This point in the rule's development exhibited an unresolved tension
between the displacement-of-competition standard stated in Hoover and
City of Boulder, and the more restrictive standard from the unanimous
Midcal opinion, the Court's two conflicting statements of how specifi-
cally nonsovereign government action must correspond to sovereign-level
policy to receive immunity. None of these opinions, as we have seen,
addressed or explained the disparity. 32
126. 455 U.S. 40 (1982). A city, which had imposed a moratorium on expansion of
cable television networks, sought state action immunity based on its home-rule status
under the state constitution; the Court denied immunity under the "state policy" require-
ment. Id at 52-56.
127. Id at 51 (quoting City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 413 (plurality opinion)). This
rendering expurgates City of Lafayette's further insistence " 'that the legislature contem-
plated the kind of action complained of,'" 435 U.S. at 415 (plurality opinion) (quoting
opinion below, 532 F.2d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 1976)). That is, City of Boulder cites City of
Lafayette in support of the displacement-of-competition standard that a majority of the
Court had specifically rejected in that case. See City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 413 (plural-
ity opinion); id at 425 n.6 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
128. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. at 51 & n.14.
129. 455 U.S. at 55; see id. at 51 n.14.
130. 466 U.S. 558 (1984). The Court granted immunity to the actions of the Arizona
Supreme Court's Committee on Examinations and Admissions in setting standards for
grading the state bar examination, based on a determination that the pertinent conduct
was that of the state supreme court itself. See id. at 569-73; infra note 291.
131. In "cases involving the anticompetitive conduct of a nonsovereign state represen-
tative, the Court has required a showing that the conduct is pursuant to a 'clearly articu-
lated and affirmatively expressed state policy' to replace competition with regulation."
466 U.S. at 568-69 (citing City of Boulder, 455 U.S. at 54). Hoover cites Midcal but does
not quote its policy requirement. Id at 569. The Hoover opinion refers to the City of
Lafayette contemplation language but neutralizes its meaning by equating it with the less
restrictive Boulder standard. See id. at 568-69.
Hoover states that nonsovereign restraints must be carried out "pursuant to" a state
policy to displace competition. Id at 569. This usage vaguely suggests a restrictive quali-
fication: the restraint must somehow follow from or reflect a particular state policy,
rather than merely occur subsequent to the expression of such a policy. In Southern
Motor Carriers and Town of Hallie, in contrast, the use of the phrase "pursuant to" gives
it no such independent meaning. See infra notes 135, 136 and accompanying text.
132. See Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 40 (Court had "never fully considered... how
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In Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference v. United States, 33 the
Court finally resolved the issue, not by choosing one position or the
other, but by denying the existence of a disparity. Southern Motor Carri-
ers repeatedly states that the Midcal test supplies the governing stan-
dard, 1 34 yet it also declares that the displacement-of-competition
standard satisfies the Midcal policy test: "As long as the State as sover-
eign clearly intends to displace competition in a particular field with a
regulatory structure, the first prong of the Midcal test is satisfied." ' 3"
Subsequent cases have not elaborated further on the content of the policy
requirement. 36
C. Criticism of the Distinction Between Sovereign and
Nonsovereign State Action
The next section expands on the Court's distinction between sovereign
and nonsovereign government policymaking as a foundation from which
to criticize the current displacement-of-competition version of the policy
clearly a state policy must be articulated for a municipality to be able to establish that its
anticompetitive activity constitutes state action").
133. 471 U.S. 48 (1985). For a full discussion of the facts of the case, see infra notes
219-35 and accompanying text.
134. See id. at 58, 62.
135. Id. at 64. This is hard to take seriously, of course, in light of the split between the
plurality and dissenting opinions in City of Lafayette. See supra notes 107-114 and ac-
companying text. For an argument that the Mississippi Public Service Commission's
approval of collective filing in Southern Motor Carriers does not satisfy the Midcal policy
requirement, see infra notes 223-35 and accompanying text.
The quoted language indicates that the Court's use of the phrase "pursuant to" else-
where in the opinion, Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 62, 65, implies no
qualification.
136. In Town of Hallie, the Court was presented with an issue of municipal conduct
reminiscent of that in City of Lafayette, but having a sounder statutory basis. The de-
fendant city participated in, rather than regulated, the water sewage transportation and
treatment market, and it was accused of harming a potential competitor in that market.
See id. at 36-37. The city had refused to supply sewage treatment services to adjacent
unincorporated townships, except by tying provision of treatment services to sewage col-
lection and transportation services, together with annexation by the city. See id. The
Court granted state action immunity using language similar to that of Southern Motor
Carriers: "the Wisconsin statutes evidence a 'clearly articulated and affirmatively ex-
pressed' state policy to displace competition with regulation in the area of municipal
provision of sewage services." 471 U.S. at 44; see id. at 47. Town of Hallie, too, recog-
nizes the Midcal test as the governing standard, though it calls it the "Lafayette two-
pronged test." 471 U.S. at 39.
The policy requirement in City of Boulder stated the alternative rejected by the City of
Lafayette plurality: the conduct must be "pursuant to" a state policy to displace competi-
tion. Compare City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 413 (plurality opinion) with City of Boulder,
455 U.S. at 51. The Court's use of the phrase "pursuant to" in Town of Hallie gives it no
independent significance. The Court said the town's actions "were taken pursuant to a
clearly articulated state policy to replace competition in the provision of sewage services
with regulation," 471 U.S. at 47 (emphasis added), but, in context, this formulation im-
plicitly equates with parallel formulations that lack the phrase "pursuant to." Town of
Hallie restates the City of Boulder test as whether a state policy to displace competition
"exists." Id. at 40.
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requirement as unresponsive to the Court's objectives. Before arguing
for an expanded, stronger emphasis of the sovereign policy concept, this
section considers attacks on this distinction by those who believe that
even the displacement-of-competition standard intrudes too much on the
sovereignty of the state.
1. Statutory Basis: Significance of the Local
Government Antitrust Act
Perhaps the most fundamental criticism of the Court's sovereign poli-
cymaking distinction is that it is invalid because it has no basis in the
Sherman Act.137 Parker, while inferring a category of action that Con-
gress did not intend to restrain, 3 did not explain why the Sherman Act
should apply to state conduct at all. Certainly the legislative history does
not illumine the precise contours of this category. a9 With so little to go
on, the Court's effort to follow presumed congressional intent perhaps
unavoidably devolved into "an attempt to resolve conflicts that may arise
between principles of federalism and the goal of the antitrust laws, unfet-
tered competition in the marketplace,'" according to the Court's own
sense of what was appropriate. 4'
The statutory invalidity argument makes little sense, however, in light
of the Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984 (the "Act"). 42
Although this statute essentially eliminates the private damages remedy
against local governments and their officials for antitrust violations, in-
junctive relief against local governments and officials remains unaf-
fected.14 3 Local government conduct, therefore, continues to be fully
137. See City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 428-30 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Easterbrook,
supra note 8, at 36-37; Garland, supra note 21, at 502.
138. See Parker, 317 U.S. at 351 (neither Sherman Act nor its legislative history indi-
cated intention "to restrain state action or official action directed by a state"); Southern
Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 56 & n.19.
139. See Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 56 n.19; cf H.R. Rep. No. 965, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 4602, 4605
[hereinafter House Report] ("review of the legislative history of the Sherman Act reveals
no evidence of an express Congressional intent to apply the antitrust laws to either state
or local governments").
140. Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 61.
141. Cf House Report, supra note 139, at 4608 ("The failure of Congress to provide
even indirect guidance on this question [immunity for local government action] ... has
left the Court free-or constrained-to use state sovereignty as the determinative princi-
ple."). In such circumstances, perhaps the best foundation for the state action doctrine
was "over 40 years of congressional acquiescence." Southern Motor Carriers. 471 U.S. at
55 n.18.
142. Pub. L. No. 98-544, 98 Stat. 2750 (1984) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 34-36 (Supp.
IV 1986)).
143. See id For example, nothing in the Act would upset the result in City of Boulder,
where a preliminary injunction against a city's regulatory program was upheld. 455 U.S.
at 47-48. Victorious plaintiffs in suits for injunctive relief still are entitled to attorney's
fees. See House Report, supra note 139, at 4620.
As for the conduct of private parties, the Act states that "no damages ... may be
recovered.., in any claim against a person based on any official action directed by a local
1988]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
subject to antitrust scrutiny unless it meets the Court's test for state ac-
tion immunity. This tacitly confirms the Court's application of the anti-
trust laws to nonsovereign action.1" If Congress had not intended local
governments to be subject to the antitrust laws, it would have eliminated
the possibility of injunctive relief as well.
The legislative history of the Act further supports the Court's sover-
eign policymaking distinction. It suggests that Congress acted primarily
to relieve local government and officials of the potential for catastrophic
loss, 145 not to vindicate local government autonomy. The House of Rep-
resentatives committee report contradicted the Court's original inference
of congressional intent regarding state regulation in Parker and criticized
the Court's immunity test as uncertain in its application. 146 It empha-
sized, however, that it was not altering the content of the state action
doctrine as applied to local government. 147 The Committee had no quar-
rel with the Court's use of "state sovereignty as the determinative princi-
ple,"' 14 or with the position that "Parker immunity could be extended to
a municipality only if its action were in furtherance of a 'clearly articu-
lated and affirmatively expressed' state policy. 1
49
Moreover, in rejecting a ban on all actions against local government
the Committee specifically expressed reluctance to defer to local regula-
tory autonomy. "If Congress were confident that the actions of local
governments and their officials were always in the public interest or never
would work unnecessary anticompetitive injury, it could simply exclude
them from the application of the antitrust laws entirely. The record does
not support such action . . . ,"50 Rather than administering "a stiff con-
government, or official or employee thereof acting in an official capacity." 15 U.S.C.
§ 36(a) (Supp. IV 1986). The managers of the bill recited an intention, however, "that
Parker and subsequent cases interpreting it shall apply by analogy to the conduct of a
local government in directing the actions of non-governmental parties, as if the local
government were a state." H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1158, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1984),
reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 4627.
144. The distinction between sovereign and nonsovereign parts of state government
had been made emphatically in Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984), issued almost
five months before final enactment of the Act and noted in the committee report. House
Report, supra note 139, at 4608 n.6.
145. See id. at 4613, 4619.
146. See id. at 4606, 4608.
147. See id. at 4603, 4615.
148. Id. at 4608.
149. Id. at 4607 (citing City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 52 (1982); Midcal, 445 U.S. 97,
105 (1980); New Motor Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 109 (1978)).
See also House Report, supra note 139, at 4603 ("The Committee understands that the
substantive law [of state action immunity] has changed, and will continue to change,
based on court interpretations.").
The National Conference of State Legislatures sponsored testimony emphatically re-
jecting alteration of the City of Boulder test for immunity. See The Local Government
Antitrust Act of 1983: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 1578, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 240-41 (1984) [hereinafter Senate Hearing] (statement of state legislator
Dick Hemstad), quoted in House Report, supra note 139, at 4614 n.19.
150. House Report, supra note 139, at 4619. Indeed, the Committee took care to
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gressional rebuke to judicial intrusion upon local policymaking,"'15 1 the
Local Government Antitrust Act confirms the basic elements of state
action doctrine, including the state policy requirement's distinction be-
tween sovereign and nonsovereign parts of state government.
2. Federalism
A second fundamental attack on the sovereign/nonsovereign distinc-
tion is that it is incompatible with, or at least a highly dubious manipula-
tion of, the tenets of federalism.' 52 Federalism has multiple meanings.
Its status as a source of limitation on the legislative branch's commerce
power is governed by Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Author-
ity.'53 There the Court concluded that "the principal and basic limit on
the federal commerce power is that inherent in all congressional action-
the built-in restraints that our system provides through state participa-
tion in federal governmental action."' 54 This conception of federalism
would seem to foreclose attack on the Court's state action antitrust doc-
trine as constitutionally invalid. The Court has premised the state action
doctrine on an inference of what Congress had intended to do in using its
commerce power to enact the antitrust laws, and in passing the Local
Government Antitrust Act of 1984, Congress endorsed the Court's
results. '5s
Federalism also represents a political ideal. In this sense the term is
aspirational, conveying the notion that organs of the national govern-
ment should not use the full extent of the power granted to them under
maintain "[t]he role of 'private attorneys general' in the antitrust enforcement scheme"
with respect to local government. Id; see id at 4620; see also id. at 4625 (Additional
Views of Rep. Jack Brooks) ("The bill, by providing for injunctive relief, recognizes that
there is a role for the antitrust regulation of local governments to ensure proper competi-
tion in local markets.").
151. Garland, Antitrust and Federalism: A Response to Professor Wiley, 96 Yale L.J.
1291, 1293 n.12 (1987).
152. See City of Boulder, 455 U.S. at 69-70 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Easterbrook,
supra note 8, at 36-37; Wiley, supra note 6, at 722, 730; Wiley, The Berkeley Rent Control
Case: Treating Victims as Villains, 1986 Sup. Ct. Rev. 157, 162; Garland, supra note 21,
at 502.
153. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
154. Id at 556. The Court overruled National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976), in determining that the defendant public mass transit authority was bound by the
minimum wage and overtime requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act. The Court
declared that "[w]ith rare exceptions, like the guarantee... of state territorial integrity,
the Constitution does not carve out express elements of state sovereignty that Congress
may not employ its delegated powers to displace." Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550. Further-
more, the Court noted:
[T]he fundamental limitation that the constitutional scheme imposes on the
Commerce Clause to protect the "States as States" is one of process rather than
one of result. Any substantive restraint on the exercise of Commerce Clause
powers.., must be tailored to compensate for possible failings in the national
political process rather than to dictate a "sacred province of state autonomy."
Id. at 554 (citation omitted).
155. See supra notes 143-51 and accompanying text.
1988]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
the Constitution, but rather should accommodate state autonomy while
pursuing national objectives. Clearly, certain proposed rules are more
federalist than others, but given that both the Court and its critics pur-
port to follow federalism, the analytical contribution of this concept to
the argument is suspect. In effect, both sides agree that some accommo-
dation of state autonomy should be made; the real issue is the appropri-
ate extent of that accommodation in the context of antitrust immunity. 15
6
The Court's restrictive equation of the state with the actions and poli-
cies of the state's legislature and supreme court is not compelled by the
idea of federalism, but it is not excluded by it, either. In other areas of
law raising issues of federalism, local government sometimes is treated
like state government and sometimes not. 157 The fact that the Court has
used a more expansive concept of sovereignty in other contexts58 does
not invalidate this usage. The variation in the Court's usage unquestion-
ably reflects concrete notions of what constitutes an appropriate balanc-
ing of national and state concerns in specific types of settings. 59
A second weakness diminishes the invocation of federalism to criticize
the Court's differentiation of sovereign and nonsovereign state poli-
cymaking. Implicit in the criticism of this distinction, especially as ap-
plied to municipal regulation, is the categorical assumption that each
state wants to minimize the role of federal antitrust law in its regulatory
sector. 160 The testimony presented to Congress before passage of the Lo-
cal Government Antitrust Act strongly contradicts such a view. The
National Conference of State Legislatures argued that "local govern-
ments are not.., a third sovereign form of government," and urged that
any corrective federal legislation "should be limited in recognition of the
constitutional responsibility of the states to define the degree of auton-
omy enjoyed by their local governments."' 16' The National Association
of Attorneys General similarly asserted that the Supreme Court's clear
articulation/active supervision test "maintained" "the principle of feder-
alism." 162 Federalism primarily addresses the opposition between na-
156. See Kennedy, Of Lawyers, Lightbulbs, and Raisins: An Analysis of the State Ac-
tion Doctrine Under the Antitrust Laws, 74 Nw. U.L. Rev. 31, 43 (1979) ("The question is
not really one of state sovereignty but comity, which in this instance means the deference
properly owing to the action of subordinate but nonetheless important governmental
entities.").
157. See Easterbrook, supra note 8, at 36 & n.31.
158. See Garland, supra note 21, at 502 n.90.
159. See Note, The Application of Antitrust Laws to Municipal Activities, 79 Colum. L.
Rev. 518, 522 n.44 (1979).
160. See, e.g., City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 438-39 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Wiley,
supra note 8, at 720-23.
161. Senate Hearing, supra note 149, at 240-41 (statement of state legislator Dick
Hemstad), quoted in House Report, supra note 139, at 4614 n. 19; see House Report, supra
note 139, at 4614 n. 19 ("in a federal system of dual sovereigns, immunization decisions
properly belong to the States").
162. Senate Hearing, supra note 149, at 146 (statement of Gerald L. Baliles, Atty.
General of Virginia); see id. at 159-60 (National Ass'n of Attorneys General, Report and
Recommendation of the Antitrust Subcommittee to Study Local Governmental Immunity
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tional and state interests. By extension, it concerns the conflict of
national and local interests. Federalism seems irrelevant, however, to is-
sues of governmental autonomy pitting local interests against state
interests. 1
63
3. Relevance to the Court's Concerns
A third criticism of the Court's distinction between sovereign and non-
sovereign policymaking is that it fails to serve the Court's own professed
purposes. 164 Because cities and state agencies are created by and receive
their powers from the state, it is argued that they should be presumed to
act for the state as much as the sovereign parts of the state government
that created them.1 65 Additionally, if agencies and cities sometimes act in
ways not anticipated by the legislature, arguably the latter has tacitly
endorsed any such deviation by failing to take corrective action or, more
probably, by failing to make any investigation suggesting the need for
corrective action. 166 From this perspective, the requirement that a chal-
(1982) [hereinafter, NAAG Report]) ("[Ti1he Parker exemption does not permit treatment
of muncipal [sic] action as state action. Indeed no other conclusion could be reached
consistent with our federalist system.").
163. Testimony sponsored by local government organizations shows that they desired
federal legislation partly to override the contrary views of state legislatures on the role of
antitrust law in the regulated sector. See Senate Hearing, supra note 149, at 27 (state-
ment of Joseph Riley, Mayor of Charleston, South Carolina, for the National League of
Cities) ("We do not believe that a matter of such fundamental importance to every city in
the Nation should be left to ... the State legislatures."); id at 37 (opposing proposal to
have states delegate antitrust immunity to local government for fear it would result in
"some states electing not to pass the necessary state legislation, others establishing only
limited antitrust protections"); id at 52 (statement of James C. Leventis, for National
Ass'n of Counties) ("Counties would be forced to go to their state legislatures to obtain
immunity.... Congress cannot force the legislatures to act, or control the extent of their
immunity action."). William J. Althaus, appearing on behalf of the U.S. Conference of
Mayors, stated:
The state and the local groups disagree on the source of the immunity,
whether it flows from the states or the federal law, and on the question of bur-
den. Whose burden is it either to arrange appropriate protections for local gov-
ernments from the antitrust laws, or to clarify the extent to which and the
means by which local governments must comply with the antitrust laws?
*.. Boulder... simply fails to comport with 20th Century notions of inter-
governmental relationships-that throughout the United States the home rule
movement has sought to return as much control as is possible to the levels of
government closest to the people, cities and counties.
Senate Hearing, supra note 149, at 64; see NAAG Report, supra note 162, at 164 ("cities
dislike the prospect of being required to petition the state legislature for legislation con-
ferring antitrust immunity").
164. Kg., Wiley, supra note 8, at 736.
165. See City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 429 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("[municipal corpo-
rations] have only such powers as are delegated them by the State .... and when they act
they exercise the State's sovereign power") (citation omitted).
166. In hearings prior to the enactment of the Local Government Antitrust Act, how-
ever, the National Conference of State Legislatures sponsored testimony endorsing the
requirement that local government's antitrust immunity depend on affirmative state au-
thorization. See Senate Heaing, supra note 149, at 240-41 (statement of state legislator
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lenged restraint implement sovereign policy may appear to be a paternal-
istic effort to enforce a certain way of delegating power167 -to achieve a
consistency that the legislature either does not know about or does not
care about.
The Court's sovereign policymaking distinction, however, has another
logic. The state action immunity doctrine reflects a balancing of compet-
ing interests, not unqualified deference towards the states. 16  The
Court's procedural test replaced earlier efforts to evaluate the necessity
or importance of individual regulatory restraints and represents a shift
from substantive examination to identification of state concerns as the
mechanism for balancing national and state interests. Accompanying the
shift is the premise that the antitrust laws should not be set aside except
in circumstances that directly further the state's regulation of its domes-
tic commerce. 69
The question then arises how to identify circumstances in which regu-
lation directly furthers the state's regulatory program. The Court might
have determined to defer to state autonomy at all costs, treating all gov-
ernment action as implementing state policy to eliminate the chance that
a state policy could be thwarted simply because it was undetectable. The
Court's decision not to assume casually that a restraint furthers state
policy reflects two main considerations. First, agency and city actions
may not implement any policy the state knows about or cares about. 70
Second, the national policies behind the antitrust laws are of particular
importance. 17'
The Court's purpose in imposing an articulation requirement identify-
ing restraints implementing state policies is not to protect the state from
Dick Hemstad), quoted in House Report, supra note 139, at 4614 n.19; supra notes 161-
63 and accompanying text.
167. See Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 71 (1977)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("It is nothing less than a novel and egregious error when this
Court uses the Sherman Act to regulate the relationship between the States and their
political subdivisions."); Easterbrook, supra note 8, at 36; Garland, supra note 21, at 502;
Page, supra note 10, at 1101; Wiley, supra note 8, at 733, 735.
168. Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 61.
169. See id.; City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 415.
170. See, e.g., City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 414 (anticompetitive policy adopted by a
city "may express its own preference, rather than that of the State"); id. at 416 (city
policy may reflect "purely parochial interests"); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S.
579, 585 (1976) ("the State's policy is neutral" on restraint approved by public service
commission); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975) (state bar associa-
tion had joined in "essentially a private anticompetitive activity").
171. In enacting the Sherman Act, "Congress, exercising the full extent of its constitu-
tional power, sought to establish a regime of competition as the fundamental principle
governing commerce in this country .... [Tihe antitrust laws establish overarching and
fundamental policies . . . ." City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 398-99 (plurality opinion)
(footnote omitted); see id. at 406 (Sherman Act "mandated competition as the polestar by
which all must be guided in ordering their business affairs"); id. at 419-20 (Burger, C.J.,
concurring) (Sherman Act expresses" 'fundamental national economic policy' "); City of
Boulder, 455 U.S. at 56 & n.19 (Sherman Act is "'the Magna Carta of free enterprise'"
(quoting United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972))).
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itself; it is to vindicate the importance of the federal policy by making
sure it is set aside only if the state manifests a minimal threshold of con-
cern, showing that the policy is not trivial or "parochial." 17 2 The point
of the Court's distinction is not that more precise delegation achieves
substantive antitrust goals or supplies a requisite political legitimacy, but
that antitrust goals are worth preserving unless the state has a perceptible
regulatory policy to the contrary. The Court has decided to set aside the
antitrust laws for state-sanctioned regulatory restraints, even if inefficient
or otherwise misguided, but not for those to which the state seems indif-
ferent. The Court leaves the determination of what is trivial or nontrivial
in the hands of the state. The procedural test for immunity is not a diffi-
cult test to satisfy, if indeed the state legislature or supreme court intends
to endorse the challenged conduct. If the immunity inquiry yields the
"wrong" answer, the state need only supply the requisite statement of
policy. 1
73
II. THE FAILURE OF THE DISPLACEMENT-OF-COMPETITION
STANDARD TO ACHIEVE THE COURT'S OBJECTIVES
The displacement-of-competition standard trivializes the sovereign/
nonsovereign distinction of the state policy requirement. Because of this,
the Court fails to achieve the stable pair of objectives underlying the de-
velopment of its highly mutable policy requirement: that immunity
should go only to restraints implementing sovereign policy and that the
utility to the state of agencies and cities as tools for such policies should
be protected. The Court's displacement-of-competition standard violates
the Court's objective of confining immunity to regulatory restraints im-
plementing state policy as expressed by sovereign branches of state gov-
ernment. This reflects the Court's fallacious concept of regulatory
policymaking; properly understood, this objective would pose a much
more substantial constraint on immunity. In addition, the Court's objec-
tive of preserving the usefulness of agencies and local government as
tools of state policy does not require adherence to the displacement-of-
competition standard.
172. See City of Boulder, 455 U.S. at 50-51 (quoting City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 412-
13 (plurality opinion)); cf Cantor, 428 U.S. at 637 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (endorsing
"isolating those areas of state regulation where the State's sovereign interest is, by the
State's own judgment, at its strongest").
173. Admittedly, the sovereign/nonsovereign policy distinction is a rough, heuristic
tool for identifying matters of state concern, carrying with it costs of requiring interpreta-
tion of state statutes and some resulting uncertainty as to outcomes. But to identify costs
does not mean that the costs are not worth paying, unless one posits that any burden on
the state interest is too much. The 1984 congressional testimony given by state govern-
ment witnesses suggested that state governments prefer the accompanying uncertainty.
See, e.g., Senate Hearing, supra note 149, at 147-48 (statement of Gerald L. Baliles, Atty.
General of Virginia), quoted in House Report, supra note 139, at 4612 n.15.
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A. Blurring of the Sovereign/Nonsovereign Distinction
The scrutiny of regulatory restraints under the displacement-of-com-
petition standard is trivial. The displacement-of-competition standard
does not address the particular restraint itself; indeed, it removes any
inquiry into the content of state policy beyond the simple question of
whether the legislature or supreme court intended to displace competi-
tion in that field.' Thus, the intention to displace competition may be
inferred from sovereign-level authorization of any regulatory restraint in
that field. Based on a legislative decision to displace competition in a
particular way, this standard gives immunity to the agency's or city's
decision further to displace competition in that field in any way it
chooses. For agencies, and for those regulated by them, the policy re-
quirement now amounts to a virtual rubberstamp, since the statute creat-
ing any agency will suffice to signify intent to displace competition
throughout the agency's purview. This standard equally will support im-
munity for any restraints imposed by local government, as long as the
legislature has authorized any form of intervention in a given field.
Under the displacement-of-competition standard, the only situation in
which governmental conduct would not satisfy the policy requirement
would be one in which an agency or city imposes an anticompetitive re-
straint in a field that the legislature has not expressed an intention to
regulate. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co. '" furnishes an example. In that
case the public service commission had approved tariffs filed by an elec-
tric utility that restrained competition in the sale of lightbulbs, but the
legislature had never expressed an intention to regulate the market for
lightbulbs.'76 This type of case is important because it represents the
only practical difference between the Court's current displacement-of-
competition policy requirement and a proposed version that would not
distinguish at all between sovereign and nonsovereign parts of govern-
ment but merely distinguish state action from private conduct."' This
174. Cf Jorde, supra note 10, at 240 ("Hoover-Hallie-SMC trilogy" requires "only a
lenient process review"); Wiley, supra note 8, at 737 ("clear-statement enforcement [in
Southern Motor Carriers and Town of Hallie is] both shallow and more selective"). This
is not surprising, since what was an issue under Midcal becomes a presumption under the
displacement-of-competition standard. Midcal gives immunity only when "the challenged
restraint" is " 'clearly articulated ... as state policy.'" California Retail Liquor Dealers
Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980) (quoting City of Lafayette, 435
U.S. at 410). The Midcal inquiry does not infer this condition from the mere intention to
displace competition; implicitly, some nonsovereign restraints may not implement state
policy.
175. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
176. This is the Court's revised explanation for denial of immunity in Cantor. See
Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 64 (1985)
(citing Cantor, 428 U.S. at 584-85); cf Cantor, 428 U.S. at 597-98 (exemption denied
because not necessary to working of Michigan's regulatory statute).
177. See City of Boulder, 455 U.S. at 69-70 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); City of Lafay-
ette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 428-30 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissent-
ing); Garland, supra note 21, at 487. Indeed, Garland seems to characterize the Court's
actual policy requirement as equivalent to the version he proposes, which merely distin-
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proposed redefinition of the policy requirement fails to recognize the re-
spective functions of the two prongs of the Midcal test. The active super-
vision half of the test distinguishes regulated conduct from effectively
private conduct.17 The state policy requirement distinguishes between
government action that implements a sovereign policy and government
action that does not. Were the Court to further dilute the policy require-
ment by ignoring the sovereign policy distinction, there would seem to be
no reason for having a separate policy requirement at all.'"
B. The Court's Objectives Closely Defined
This Article's contention that the current version of the policy require-
ment is inconsistent with the Court's objectives requires precise definition
of those objectives. A starting point is the Court's invocation of federal-
ism. "' ° The Court consistently has respected regulatory action under-
guishes between state action and private conduct. See id at 501 ("the 'clear articulation'
requirement ensures that antitrust law will not be set aside unless the state does in fact
intend to displace competition, i.e., the challenged scheme does not simply represent un-
sanctioned private conduct" (emphasis added)). He distinguishes "action taken by the
state qua state" or "true state regulation," which receive immunity, from "mere state
'authorization' of private anticompetitive conduct" or "delegation to private parties of
the power to restrain competition," which do not. Id (footnote omitted); cf Garland,
Antitrust and Federalism: A Response to Professor Wiley, 96 Yale LJ. 1291, 1293-94
(1987) (Court's test is "a tolerable proxy" for one denying immunity only to "state laws
that do no more than delegate to business competitors the power to restrain competi-
tion"). Garland seems to treat the Court's displacement-of-competition language as an
incidental, rather than as a fundamental, feature of the Court's policy requirement.
Thus, he criticizes City of Lafayette and City of Boulder for holding that "cities were not
entitled to the same antitrust immunity as states; like private defendants, cities would
have to satisfy at least the first prong of MidcaL" Garland, supra note 21, at 494. But
state government itself, in the Court's analysis, comprises both sovereign and nonsover-
eign parts, which are treated differently for purposes of the policy requirement. City of
Lafayette treats cities no differently than agencies. See 435 U.S. at 412 n.42 (plurality
opinion). Unlike the direct actions of legislatures and state supreme courts, both city and
agency conduct, under City of Lafayette and subsequent cases, are subject to the policy
requirement. See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text. Further, under Town of
Hallie, the regulatory conduct of cities, like that of agencies, must still satisfy the policy
prong of Midcal. See Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 39-44 (1985).
The state action doctrine distinguishes cities and agencies, if at all, only by the operation
of the active supervision requirement. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
178. The active supervision requirement conditions immunity upon the actual "exer-
cise of regulatory oversight" of private anticompetitive conduct by government. South-
ern Motor Carriers Rate Conference v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 62 n.23 (1985)
(quoting I P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 45, q 213a, at 73).
179. Garland says "the 'clear articulation' [policy] requirement ensures that ... the
challenged scheme does not simply represent unsanctioned private conduct." Garland,
supra note 21, at 501. This, however, is accomplished by the active supervision require-
ment. If the requisite authorization could come from any part of government, including
the regulating entity, then any restraint satisfying the supervision requirement would nec-
essarily satisfy the policy articulation requirement. This would turn the two-part Midcal
test into a tautology. Cf Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105 ("First, the challenged restraint must
be 'one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy'; second, the policy
must be 'actively supervised' by the State itself.").
180. See Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 61 (purpose of state action doctrine is
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taken directly by a state legislature or supreme court,""' and increased
concern for federalism would seem to account for the change in the pol-
icy requirement from the strict sovereign policy standard of City of La-
fayette and Midcal to the minimal displacement-of-competition standard
of Southern Motor Carriers and Town of Hallie.182 The terms in which
the Court has addressed this issue, however, reflect a narrower concept of
federalism in this context than recent commentary would suggest.
In a general sense, the Court's policy requirement is intended to pro-
tect the states' ability to regulate their commerce.' 83 It is the state as
sovereign, however, rather than the state and local political process gen-
erally, to which deference is owed under the Court's concept of federal-
ism. ' 4 The Court views cities and agencies as nonsovereign instruments
of state policy, 185 whose importance lies in their usefulness to the state. 1
86
By itself, the objective of maintaining the usefulness of agencies and cities
to the state still does not account for the Court's policy requirement. If
this were the Court's only goal, it would be logical to immunize all
agency or local government action simply to avoid even the most remote
possibility of interfering with a state purpose. The constraining objective
underlying the policy requirement is to compromise antitrust goals only
"to resolve conflicts that may arise between principles of federalism and the goal of the
antitrust laws, unfettered competition in the marketplace"); cf 324 Liquor Corp. v.
Duffy, 107 S. Ct. 720, 725 (1987) (Parker reflects "principles of federalism and state
sovereignty"); Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 38 (same).
181. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 109-15, 132-36 and accompanying text.
183. See Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 56; Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S.
350, 360 n.11 (1977) (quoting Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 793 (1975));
cf Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 632 (1976) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (legis-
lative history of Sherman Act reflects "intent not to intrude upon the authority of the
several States to regulate 'domestic' commerce").
184. Even the opinions that articulate the deferential displacement-of-competition
standard affirm this long-standing distinction. See Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at
63-64; Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 38-39 (citing City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 412-13
(plurality opinion)); supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text. The Court also notes the
"danger" that even under the displacement-of-competition standard, a city might "seek
to further purely parochial public interests at the expense of more overriding state goals."
Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 47.
185. E.g., Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 64 ("States ... implement through
regulatory agencies their anticompetitive policies"); Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 39
(Parker doctrine permits states to use their municipalities "'to administer state regula-
tory policies' " (quoting City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 415 (plurality opinion))); Commu-
nity Communications v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 51 (1982) ("a State may frequently
choose to effect its policies through the instrumentality of its cities and towns").
186. See Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 61 (opposing reducing "the range of
regulatory alternatives available to the State"); id. at 64 (assessing doctrinal impact on
"usefulness" of state agencies).
The Court also expressed concern that "requiring ... explicit authorization by the
State might have deleterious and unnecessary consequences" detrimental to "municipali-
ties' local autonomy and authority to govern themselves." Town of Halite, 471 U.S. at
44; see Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 64. In context, the point seems to be that
impinging on local autonomy would interfere with the way the state intends municipali-
ties to operate.
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in order to realize sovereign state policies. Since before City of Lafayette,
the Court repeatedly has insisted that a regulatory restraint must imple-
ment policy of a sovereign branch of state government.' 8 7 The cases of
the last decade, in particular, reflect the tension between the two
objectives.'"8
Merrick Garland characterizes the policy requirement as expressing
"respect for the political process at the state or municipal level."' 89 But
if the Court intended its policy requirement to avoid interference with
state or municipal policy, one would expect any government involvement
to satisfy it.'9 ' Instead the Court insists that state or local government
actions must implement policy of a sovereign part of state government.' 9 '
187. See supra notes 51-54, 66-67 and accompanying text; cf Page, supra note 10, at
1115 ("state must clearly articulate the policy alleged to conflict with the antitrust laws").
In Page's view, the Court's approach "dictates judicial restraint as long as the 'process of
representation' affords interested parties an opportunity to influence the formulation of
policy," id. at 1107, but denies immunity when "the presumption of popular consent...
is unwarranted." Id at 1113. "The resulting distinction between administrative and leg-
islative policy," id at 1101, does not seem to account for the Court's treatment of munici-
pal restraints. Legislative as well as administrative components of city government are
treated like state agencies in the Court's analysis. See supra notes 79-84 and accompany-
ing text. In City of Boulder, for example, the offending municipal conduct was an ordi-
nance enacted by the city council. 455 U.S. at 45-46.
188. See supra notes 120-36 and accompanying text. Professor Wiley asserts that since
the 1970's, the Court's state action cases have "intruded more and more on state and
local regulatory policy," in "a largely unarticulated ... response to growing fears of
regulatory capture." Wiley, supra note 8, at 714, 728; cf Easterbrook, supra note 8, at 27
(state action doctrine reflects Court's assumption that "state regulatory laws are anticom-
petitive dispensations to politically powerful groups, are deleterious to consumers, and
therefore ought to be strictly controlled to preserve at least some of the benefits of compe-
tition"). The Court's apparent concern with regulatory capture, however, was tempo-
rary. Among the Court's majority or plurality opinions, the most recent statement cited
by Wiley that expresses concern with private influence over regulatory decisions is now a
decade old. See Wiley, supra note 8, at 727-28 (citing City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 406,
408 (plurality opinion)). By the time of City of Lafayette, however, the Court was already
retreating from substantive criteria for immunity. See supra notes 73-78 and accompany-
ing text. The Court had already turned a blind eye towards the anticompetitive effects of
direct regulatory action by sovereign parts of state government. See supra notes 52-57,
66-67 and accompanying text. Indeed, since City of Lafayette, sovereign authorization or
contemplation of any nonsovereign regulatory restraint supports immunity regardless of
any impact on competition. See City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 407 n.33, 417 (plurality
opinion); supra note 19 and accompanying text. Furthermore, the Court refused to look
at other indicia of private domination of the regulatory apparatus. See City of Lafayette,
435 U.S. at 411 n.41; supra note 20 and accompanying text.
See also Garland, supra note 177, at 1291 n.3; Garland, supra note 21, at 490-93; Wi-
ley, Reply, Revision and Apology in Antitrust Federalism, 96 Yale LJ. 1277, 1277-80,
1282 & n.29 (1987).
189. Garland, supra note 21, at 508. In Garland's analysis, this objective is balanced in
the overall test by the active supervision requirement, which expresses "respect for Con-
gress' mandate in the Sherman Act." Id; see id. at 501 (Court intends to protect true
state regulation and bar mere state authorization of private anticompetitive conduct).
190. Even if a city or agency displaced competition in a field not chosen for regulation
by the legislature or state supreme court, a principle of respect for the political process
would seem to dictate allowing immunity anyway.
191. The Court will not grant immunity to regulatory intervention by an agency or a
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Similarly, Professor Jorde's view that because "Parker requires some ve-
hicle for separating state from private activity," '92 the current policy re-
quirement achieves the "needed balance between economic federalism
and antitrust values"1 93 does not quite suffice as an explanation. If the
Court merely wanted to distinguish state or regulated activity from pri-
vate activity, the policy requirement would seem to be redundant because
the active supervision requirement serves that purpose. 194 The Court's
policy requirement, then, is not an unalloyed expression of deference to
state and local regulation, nor is it meant to deny immunity only to pri-
vate behavior.
C. Implementation of State Policy
1. Fallacious Presumption of Consistency with State Policy
The Court repeatedly has expressed the objective of confining immu-
nity to regulatory restraints that implement state policy. 95 The Court
now asserts that the displacement-of-competition standard uniformly
achieves this objective-that all restraints satisfying the displacement-of-
competition version of the policy requirement will satisfy the Midcal ver-
sion. 196 In effect, the Court presumes that once a sovereign-level branch
of the state has displaced competition in a field with regulation, any and
all restraints carried out thereafter in that field by an agency or city will
implement state policy.
This presumption overlooks the disparity between sovereign policy
and nonsovereign conduct that can arise from a combination of vague
statutory delegation' 97 and the tendency of agencies and cities to expand
city unless the subject field has been chosen for regulation by the legislature or supreme
court. See supra notes 176-77 and accompanying text.
192. Jorde, supra note 10, at 248 (emphasis in original).
193. Id.
194. The policy requirement would have no function independent of the supervision
requirement if all forms of genuine regulation, regardless of the institutional source of the
policy, satisfied the policy requirement. See supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text.
Professor Jorde also more broadly relates the state action doctrine to "the values of
economic federalism: citizen participation in government, efficiency in government, crea-
tive experimentation, and diffusion of power." Jorde, supra note 10, at 230-31. The test
for state action immunity effects "a balance between antitrust and economic federalism
values." Id. at 247. It is unclear, however, to what extent these values "play an impor-
tant role in the modern state action doctrine." Id. at 234. The proposed values would
seem to dictate rejection of even the requirement that sovereign parts of state government
must decide when competition is to be displaced with regulation in a particular field. See
supra notes 176-77 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
196. "As long as the State as sovereign clearly intends to displace competition in a
particular field with a regulatory structure, the first prong of the Midcal test is satisfied."
Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 64; see supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text;
cf Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 47 (actions of city taken pursuant to a clearly articulated
state policy to replace competition with regulation are immune).
197. E.g., 1 F. Cooper, State Administrative Law 32-33 (1965); B. Owen & R. Bracu-
tigam, The Regulation Game 3 (1978) (broad enabling statutes "can be used to rational-
ize virtually any degree of intervention").
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their jurisdiction and otherwise exceed the legislative mandate. 98 Agen-
cies and cities may damage competition in ways not contemplated by the
legislature because they do not recognize, or are indifferent to, the impact
on competition that their actions may impose, especially when that im-
pact falls outside the line of commerce or geographical area with which
the regulatory body is primarily concerned. 199 This problem can be par-
ticularly serious when a regulated industry dominates the regulatory pro-
cess or when a city effectively regulates its own activities as a market
participant2 O°
The presumption that any and all nonsovereign restraints imposed in a
field chosen by the state for regulation will further state policy clearly is
incorrect for instances in which the state also has expressed a policy in-
consistent with the particular nonsovereign restraint in question.20 '
198. This phenomenon has been recognized by the Court. See, eg., Town of Hallie,
471 U.S. at 47 (cities may "seek to further purely parochial public interests at the expense
of more overriding state goals"); City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 414 (plurality opinion)
(anticompetitive policy adopted by a city "may express its own preference, rather than
that of the State"); id. at 414 n.44 ("state policy may be contrary to that adopted by a
political subdivision, yet, for a variety of reasons, might not render the local policy un-
lawful under state law"); id at 415-16 (city policy may reflect "purely parochial inter-
ests"); id at 410 (in Goldfarb the "State Bar, though acting within its broad powers...
was not executing the mandate of the State"); Cantor, 428 U.S. at 585 ("the State's policy
is neutral" on restraint approved by public service commission); see also I F. Cooper,
supra note 197, at 32-33, 41-42 (administrative agencies tend to use discretionary powers
to expand their jurisdiction beyond what the legislature intended, and commonly adapt
policies extending beyond or even conflicting with the legislature's intent); Aranson, Gell-
horn & Robinson, A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 6 (1982)
(systematic analysis of delegation includes "'agency costs,'" defined as "costs engen-
dered by a divergence of the agent's goals and those of the principal"); id. at 48
("[l]urisdictional expansion historically has been an important objective of most regula-
tory agencies"); id at 62; Easterbrook, supra note 8, at 31 ("because employees of a
regulatory apparatus have goals of their own, they may turn the agency to pursuits unan-
ticipated by the legislature").
199. See, e.g., 1 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 45, 214, at 86 ("few state agencies
are sensitive ... to the possibly harmful effects of the stated utility practice on other
markets"); 2 A. Kahn, The Economics of Regulation 28 (1971) (regulation limiting com-
petition tends to become progressively more extensive in order to prevail over continuing
competitive pressures); id. at 114-15 (regulatory process has anticompetitive bias); infra
notes 326-30 and accompanying text.
200. See, e.g., City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 408 (plurality opinion) ("as owners and
providers of services, [local governments] are fully capable of aggrandizing other eco-
nomic units with which they interrelate"); 2 A. Kahn, supra note 199, at 5; Barron,
Business and Professional Licensing-California, A Representative Example, 18 Stan. L
Rev. 640, 644, 649-57 (1966); Flynn, Trends in Federal Antitrust Doctrine Suggesting
Future Directions for State Antitrust Enforcement, 4 J. Corp. L. 479, 503-05 (1979); Jor-
dan, Producer Protection, Prior Market Structure and the Effects of Government Regula-
tion, 15 J.L. & Econ. 151, 153-54, 174-76 (1972); Rose, Occupational Licensing: A
Framework for Analysis, 1979 Ariz. St. L.J. 189, 199-200; Note, Antitrust Immunity for
State Agencies: A Proposed Standard, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1484, 1490-91, 1494-96 (1985);
infra notes 328, 330 and accompanying text; see also Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 792 (bar asso-
ciation, a state agency, had joined in "essentially a private anticompetitive activity").
201. This is not to say, of course, that the restraint is unlawful as a matter of state law.
See, e.g., City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 414 n.44 (plurality opinion) ("state policy may be
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Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar 2 ' provides an example. In such cases, the
displacement-of-competition standard will support immunity because of
its concern solely with the fact that the sovereign body has displaced
competition in the field with regulation.2"3 By looking only to the inten-
tion to regulate and disregarding more specific expressions of sovereign-
level policy running contrary to the particular restraint, however, the dis-
placement-of-competition rule confounds, rather than respects, state pol-
icy. This result could be avoided if the displacement-of-competition rule
were modified so as to apply only in the absence of contrary sovereign-
level policy, thus operating as a rebuttable, rather than an irrebuttable,
presumption.
More common is the case in which a statute has authorized some form
of regulation in the same field as the challenged restraint, but is silent
regarding the particular type of restraint created by the agency or the
city. The Court's explanation for construing legislative authorization of
some form of regulation as affirmative support for any other restraint
conceived by an agency or local government is that both the legislature's
intention to displace competition and the nonsovereign restraint are "an-
ticompetitive." 2" The Court seems to reason that this common trait of
anticompetitiveness insures consistency of content, so that any further
innovation by an agency or city always will follow logically from the
sovereign-level policy as an unstated "detail."20 5 The Court's own previ-
ous experience strongly suggests that the Court is incorrect in conclu-
sively presuming consistency with sovereign policy in all such
circumstances.206
contrary to that adopted by a political subdivision, yet, for a variety of reasons, might not
render the local policy unlawful under state law").
202. See Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 790-92. There the state supreme court clearly displaced
competition in the field of lawyers' services (and indeed, with respect to the pricing of
such services), id. at 789, but it also expressed a policy contrary to the impact of the
alleged price-fixing scheme concerted by the state and county bar associations. See City
of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 410 (plurality opinion) (state bar in Goldfarb, "though acting
within its broad powers .... was not executing the mandate of the State"); infra notes
313-14 and accompanying text; see also City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 416 (dissent's ap-
proach "would hold anticompetitive municipal action free from federal antitrust enforce-
ment even when state statutes specifically provide that municipalities shall be subject to
the antitrust laws of the United States").
203. See supra notes 135, 174 and accompanying text.
204. See Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 64-65.
205. See id. at 64 (given that the legislature had chosen an "inherently anticompetitive
rate-setting process," permitting collective rate-making fell within the scope of "details"
left to the commission's discretion); id. at 65 ("if the State's intent to establish an an-
ticompetitive regulatory program is clear .... the State's failure to describe the implemen-
tation of its policy in detail" will not exclude it from immunity).
206. The City of Boulder and Hoover opinions, which articulate a displacement-of-
competition standard, rather awkwardly avoid Midcal's contradictory import. See supra
notes 126-32 and accompanying text. Furthermore, in City of Lafayette, a majority of the
Court took the position that the displacement-of-competition standard could not ensure
that municipal restraints would be consistent with legislative policy. See supra notes 101-
15 and accompanying text.
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To posit consistency on the basis of such abstraction is nonsensical.
Certainly, all forms of regulatory intervention displace competition, but
in such widely varying degrees as to undermine the usefulness of this
basis for classification. The displacement-of-competition standard covers
too wide a range of phenomena for it to be a meaningful description of
state policy. The monopoly franchise and the simple regulation of entry
into a market are both anticompetitive and are treated as indistinguish-
able by the broad brush of the displacement-of-competition standard, yet
they stand far apart in terms of the extent to which they displace compe-
tition. In between lies an extensive and varied middle ground of regula-
tory structures that might implement any combination of restraints on
entry, price and other aspects of competitive conduct."0
It is unreasonable to assume that state legislatures are insensitive or
indifferent to the distinctions among the wide range of regulatory
forms.20 8 Whether one perceives the legislature's ultimate goal to be fur-
thering some vision of the public interest2"9 or conferring benefits upon
the highest-bidding special interest group,2 0 legislatures presumably dis-
place competition in a given field in order to address a concrete problem.
Any regulatory solution the legislature considers must balance the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of competition and government intervention
for the field concerned.21 ' There is reason to presume that a legislature
intends to preserve competition to the extent it does not disrupt it, even
in sectors of the state's economy in which it has authorized regulation.21 2
207. See, e.g., Hovenkamp & Mackerron, supra note 8, at 767.
208. Cf Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S at 64.
209. Under the traditional view, a legislature displaces competition in a market be-
cause it perceives that the market is a natural monopoly or otherwise presents a failure of
competition, so that some form of regulatory intervention is needed to protect consumers.
See, e.g., Cantor, 428 U.S. at 595-96 & n.33 (quoting Otter Tail Power Co. v. United
States, 410 U.S. 366, 389 (1973)). See generally S. Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform 15-
19 (1982); B. Mitnick, The Political Economy of Regulation 296-310 (1980).
210. See, e.g., B. Mitnick, supra note 209, at 109-11; Easterbrook, supra note 8, at 27-
28; Wiley, supra note 8, at 724-25.
211. The Court's explanation of its displacement-of-competition standard tacitly ig-
nores the residuum of competition existing in most regulated markets. The Court uses
the terms "regulation" and "competition" as if they were incompatible phenomena, refer-
ring, for example, to the "perfectly efficient" unregulated market (a theoretical
microeconomic model) as the alternative to "a regulatory program." See Southern Motor
Carriers, 471 U.S. at 65 n.25. But the great middle ground among regulatory structures
really constitutes combinations of regulation and competition; regulation entirely "dis-
places" competition, if at all, only in the case of franchise monopoly. See. e.g., 2 A.
Kahn, supra note 199, at 28-30, 113-14. The portion of a firm's decisionmaking that is
not regulated will follow competitive incentives. See, e.g., City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at
405 n.31 (plurality opinion); Cantor, 428 U.S. at 596.
212. Otherwise regulatory statutes might be analogized to letters of marque, or hunt-
ing licenses. See Senate Hearing, supra note 149, at 145 (statement of Gerald L Baliles,
for National Association of Attorneys General) ("we should not lose sight of the reason
for the federal antitrust laws-a national policy of competition in the marketplace");
NAAG Report, supra note 162, at 168 (noting "the interests of the states in providing a
consistent approach to the marketplace within their boundaries"); Douglas & Mullenix,
supra note 7, at 521 ("many state laws are intended only to restrict one aspect of competi-
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Indeed, states sometimes count on federal antitrust law as a useful
residual constraint even in regulated sectors.21 3 The precise degree to
which to displace competition 14 lies at the heart of the legislature's
choice from among the "range of regulatory alternatives available to the
State., 2 15
The widely differing forms of regulation are not fungible. Whatever
the legislature's purpose, that purpose will not be satisfied equally by the
regulation of service quality and the granting of a monopoly franchise.
Furthermore, a legislature's choice of one type of regulation does not
tion"). It is also suggestive that the attorneys general of five states filed amicus briefs
urging the Court to affirm summary judgment in the government's favor in Southern
Motor Carriers. See 471 U.S. at 49.
213. See City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 416 (plurality opinion); Senate Hearing, supra
note 149, at 147 (statement of Gerald L. Baliles, for National Association of Attorneys
General) ([G]ranting city government blanket antitrust immunity "would not be a wise
policy decision .... [Tbo exclude allegedly anticompetitive actions entirely from judicial
review may leave an injured party without adequate recourse and allow such actions to
go unchecked."). A committee of the National Association of Attorneys General stated:
Anticompetitive municipal actions... may not necessarily reflect state policy,
but may in fact be directly contrary to expressed or implied state policy favoring
competition.... Permitting thousands of governmental entities to become regu-
lators of our economy without restraint and without consideration of the
broader goals of national economic policy goals is not consistent with the prin-
ciples underlying the enactment of the Sherman Act.
NAAG Report, supra note 162, at 160 (emphasis added); see also id. at 166 (cites state
legislative committee finding that enacting broad legislation supporting immunity "could
act to protect abuses by public officials"); Senate Hearing, supra note 149, at 37 (state-
ment of Joseph Riley, for the National League of Cities) (some states would elect not to
enact legislation providing antitrust immunity to local government or might establish
"only limited antitrust protections"); id. at 52-53 (statement of James C. Leventis, for
National Association of Counties) ("Generally, states would consider immunity on a nar-
row, functional basis.... [B]y and large, those that have provided immunity have done so
in narrow categories."); id. at 62 (statement of William J. Althaus, for U.S. Conference of
Mayors) ("the states have not been forthcoming in attempting to protect their local gov-
ernments from antitrust scrutiny").
In this light, a state legislature's use of broad generalities in delegating regulatory
power may reflect, not indifference to the agency's use of that power, but an expectation
that federal antitrust law would operate as a constraint if the agency were to displace
competition in ways not implied by the statute. The displacement-of-competition version
of the policy requirement disrupts the state's ability to use federal antitrust law as a
residual constraint in this way. Whereas Midcal leaves the burden on the agency or city
to stay within the implications of the statute or else seek to have it amended, the displace-
ment-of-competition standard gives the agency or city free rein. It then becomes the
legislature's burden to try to anticipate and affirmatively exclude such actions. See Bry-
ant & Bellak, State Antitrust Enforcement and State Regulated Industries, 32 U. Fla. L.
Rev. 923, 923 (1980) ("Historically anticompetitive activity by state regulated industries
has not been effectively controlled by either state or federal antitrust law .... State anti-
trust enforcement has been hindered by inadequate resources and overreliance on federal
enforcement.").
214. See 2 A. Kahn, supra note 199, at 113-14. "The decision to regulate never repre-
sents a clean break with competition.... The determination of the proper mixture of
competitive rivalry and government orders in the formula for social control is or ought to
be the central, continuing responsibility of legislatures and regulatory commissions." Id.
(citations omitted).
215. See Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 61.
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imply approval of the alternatives; if anything, it implies the opposite.
Nonsovereign conduct that displaces competition in a different way from
that affirmatively indicated by the state does not further state policy; it
conflicts with state policy. To treat anything an agency or city does as a
"detail" of the legislature's policy is to ignore any such distinctions." 6
The Court's assertion that the displacement-of-competition and Mid-
cal versions of the policy requirement are equivalent,217 then, must be
regarded as wishful thinking. Simply because a sovereign part of the
state government has displaced competition with regulation, it does not
follow that any restraint thereafter conceived in that field by an agency
or city implements the state's policy. Legislatures are not incapable of
conceiving regulatory policy in terms more precise than regulation and
competition,218 and the fact that the many forms of regulation are an-
ticompetitive does not suffice to make them fungible from a policymaking
perspective. A regulatory restraint that has an impact on competition
other than what the legislature intended should not be deemed to further
the legislature's policy. The displacement-of-competition standard, in
supporting immunity for a substantial class of restraints instituted by
state agencies or local government that cannot plausibly be said to imple-
ment state policy, defeats the Court's objective of confining immunity to
those restraints that implement state policy.
2. Illustrative Cases
The Court's recent cases reflect a presumption that once a sovereign-
level branch of the state has displaced competition in the field with regu-
lation, any and all restraints carried out thereafter in that field by an
agency or city will implement state policy. The preceding discussion
showed, in general terms, that this presumption is inaccurate. This sec-
tion uses three of the Court's own cases to illustrate instances of non-
sovereign government action, undertaken in areas chosen by the state for
regulation, which do not implement sovereign policy.
a. Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States
In Southern Motor Carriers, associations of private motor carriers re-
ceived immunity for their practice of filing collective tariffs with public
service commissions in four states.219 In three of the states, statutes ex-
216. See supra notes 204-05 and accompanying text; see also Note, supra note 200, at
1496-97 (application of lax immunity test to state agencies facilitates anticompetitive ac-
tivity which may conflict with state policy).
217. Compare Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105 ("the challenged restraint must be 'one clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy'" (quoting City of Lafayette, 435
U.S. at 410 (plurality opinion))) with Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 64 ("As long
as the State as sovereign clearly intends to displace competition in a particular field with a
regulatory structure, the first prong of the Midcal test is satisfied ...
218. See infra note 261 and accompanying text.
219. 471 U.S. at 65-66. Motor carriers were required to file tariffs of their intrastate
rates with the respective public service commissions for approval. Id at 50. In these
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pressly permitted such collective filing.22° In the fourth, Mississippi, the
public service commission permitted the practice, but the only pertinent
expression of Mississippi legislative policy was the statute directing the
commission to prescribe "just and reasonable" rates for motor carri-
ers.2"' The Mississippi legislature plainly had displaced competition in
the trucking field with a regulato y structure.222 The Court's effort, how-
ever, to show that collective rate making itself was "'clearly articulated
and affirmatively expressed as state policy,' ,1223 as Midcal requires, is
unconvincing.
The Court conceded that the Mississippi legislature had "not specifi-
cally addressed collective ratemaking" 224 and referred to "the State's fail-
ure to describe the implementation of its policy in detail., 225 But what
evidence suggests that collective ratemaking was part of the Mississippi
legislature's policy? Midcal requires, after all, that the challenged re-
straint itself must be "'one clearly articulated and affirmatively ex-
pressed as state policy.' 226 Certainly the apparent intent of the other
three legislatures to "achieve the desired balance between the efficiency
of collective ratemaking and the competition fostered by individual sub-
missions" 227 establishes nothing about the Mississippi legislature's intent.
The Court, however, merely observed that the legislature chose an "in-
herently anticompetitive ratesetting process" and asserted that permit-
ting collective ratemaking fell within the scope of "details" left to the
commission's discretion.228
These contentions do not plausibly link the commission's action to the
legislature's policy. Because the Court concretely identified only a legisla-
tive policy to institute regulatory ratesetting, we can dismiss the notion
that collective ratemaking was "necessary to effectuate state policy. '"229
Can collective ratemaking otherwise be classified as an unexpressed de-
tail of the Mississippi statute? While any broadly worded grant of regu-
latory authority leaves "details" to the Commission's discretion, such a
delegation hardly constitutes meaningful evidence of legislative policy in
favor of collective ratemaking. Rate regulation does not imply collective
ratemaking any more than it implies requiring all truckers to join in bu-
reau rates or awarding a monopoly franchise to a single trucking firm.
Collective ratemaking displaces competition substantially more than
states, the competing carriers were permitted to agree as a group on their rates and to
jointly file collective tariffs. Id. at 51.
220. Id. at 51 & n.4, 63 & n.24.
221. Id. at 63.
222. See id. at 64.
223. Id. at 57 (quoting Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105 (quoting City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at
410 (plurality opinion))).
224. 471 U.S. at 63.
225. Id. at 65.
226. 445 U.S. at 105 (quoting City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 410 (plurality opinion)).
227. Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 59.
228. Id. at 64.
229. Id.
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mere rate regulation.23 ° While the legislatures in the other three states
found it appropriate to supplement their rate regulation statutes with col-
lective ratemaking statutes, Mississippi's did not.231 As intuition would
suggest, the Mississippi legislature had not "clearly sanctioned" 2' 2 some-
thing it had not "addressed. '233 Collective ratemaking, not rate regula-
tion, was the challenged restraint. In Mississippi, that restraint was not,
as Midcal requires, "'one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed
as state policy.' ,234 The Mississippi commission was indeed "[a]cting
alone" in permitting it.235
b. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.
In City of Lafayette, two Louisiana cities that owned and operated
electrical utilities sought state action immunity for various exclusionary
conduct.236 State statutes authorized municipal ownership and operation
of electrical utilities, but more detailed statutory support for the re-
straints in question was lacking.237 The displacement-of-competition
rule would grant immunity based on the legislature's displacement of
competition in the provision of electrical service. 1 8 In Town of Hallie v.
City of Eau Claire239 the Court suggested that City of Lafayette com-
ported with this position.2' In fact, however, the City of Lafayette plu-
rality held these facts were insufficient to warrant a finding of
230. As would be expected, collective rate-making tends to generate higher rates. See
Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 54 (Court of Appeals finding); kL at 77 n.20 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting) (quoting S. Rep. No. 641, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1980)); see also
Garland, supra note 21, at 493 & n.41 (noting scholarly criticism of trucking regulation
as a classic instance of inefficient regulation). This distinction provided the rationale for
the government's suit, which did not attack rate regulation itself. Southern Motor Carri-
ers, 471 U.S. at 52-53.
231. 471 U.S. at 63. This issue obviously was foreseeable to, and within the compe-
tence of, the other three legislatures.
232. See id. (immunity warranted "only if collective ratemaking is clearly sanctioned
by the legislatures of the four States").
233. Idt
234. Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105 (quoting City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 410 (plurality
opinion)).
235. See 471 U.S. at 62-63 ("Acting alone," Mississippi commission "could not immu-
nize private anticompetitive conduct.").
236. 435 U.S. at 392 n.6, 403-05. A private utility alleged that the cities conspired to
engage in sham litigation to interfere with the utility's construction of a nuclear power
plant, and conspired to exclude competition by the use of covenants and long-term supply
agreements, and by requiring customers in some areas to buy electricity in order to re-
ceive water and gas service. Id. at 392 n.6.
237. See 435 U.S. at 391 & n.2 (citing La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 33:1326 (West 1951); La.
Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 33:4162 to 33:4163 (West 1966)).
238. Cf Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 44 (Wisconsin statutes showed clear policy to
"displace competition with regulation in the area of municipal provision of sewage serv-
ices"). Like the City of Eau Claire in Town of Hallie, the Louisiana cities pointed to
enabling statutes from which "anticompetitive effects logically would result" in this area.
See id at 42.
239. 471 U.S. 34 (1985).
240. See id at 39-40.
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immunity.2 4 '
c. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar
In Goldfarb the Court, applying the now-disclaimed compulsion re-
quirement, denied immunity to the efforts of state and county bar as-
sociations to secure adherence to minimum fee schedules.24 2 The Midcal
test would also deny immunity.2 43 The displacement-of-competition
standard, however, would support immunity based on the legislature's
and supreme court's clear intention to regulate the practice of law. 2 "4 In
Southern Motor Carriers, the Court purported to reconcile Goldfarb with
the displacement-of-competition standard on the ground that "the State
as sovereign did not intend to do away with competition among law-
241. See supra notes 109-15 and accompanying text. The City of Lafayette plurality
required a clear showing that "'the legislature contemplated the kind of action com-
plained of.'" 435 U.S. at 415 (quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,
532 F.2d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 1976) (footnote omitted)).
242. 421 U.S. at 792-93. The challenged restraint was a county bar association's advi-
sory minimum fee schedule, modelled after a fee schedule promulgated by the state bar
association and indirectly enforced by the state bar association. Id. at 776-77. The state
bar association was the administrative agency through which the state supreme court
regulated the practice of law in the state. Id. at 776.
The county bar's fee schedule technically was advisory, id. at 776, but the state bar had
published reports endorsing the concept of fee schedules and proposing specific fees, id. at
777 n.4, which "provided the impetus" for the county association to adopt almost identi-
cal fee schedules. Id. at 777 n.4, 791 n.21. The state bar also issued ethical opinions
warning that attorneys could not ignore fee schedules in setting their own fees. See id. at
776-78. In an ethical opinion the state bar declared that for an attorney habitually to
charge "less than the suggested minimum fee schedule adopted by his local bar Associa-
tion" would raise a presumption of misconduct. Id. at 778, 782-83. In one of its reports
recommending the advisory fee schedules, the state bar warned that a lawyer who regu-
larly billed less than the customary charges in order to increase his own business would
be engaging in "'a form of solicitation contrary to Canon 27 and also a violation of
Canon 7, which forbids the efforts of one lawyer to encroach upon the employment of
another.'" 421 U.S. at 777 n.4 (quoting minimum-fee schedule report of Virginia State
Bar (1962)). In another report, the state bar warned that to "publicly criticize lawyers
who charge more than the suggested fees ... might in itself be evidence of solicitation."
Id.
The Court found that because of the prospect of professional disciplinary action
against attorneys charging a lower fee, "the desire of attorneys to comply with announced
professional norms," and the assurance that other attorneys would not undercut those
prices, the activities relating to the fee schedule constituted price fixing. Id.'at 781-82; see
id. at 778 n.6, 782 n.9, 791 n.21.
243. See Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 61.
244. The state supreme court was authorized by statute to "regulate the practice of
law" and had "inherent power to regulate the practice of law." Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 789
& n.18. The state bar was "the administrative agency through which the Virginia
Supreme Court regulate[d] the practice of law in that State." Id. at 776 (footnote omit-
ted). The state bar's disciplinary function was confirmed by statute, id. at 776 n.2, and it
was authorized by the state supreme court to issue opinions interpreting the court's ethi-
cal rules. Id. at 791. The regulated nature of this service market is shown perhaps most
clearly in the restriction of entry; to take an example pertinent in Goldfarb, only an attor-
ney, and only one licensed in Virginia, could "legally examine a title." 421 U.S. at 782.
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yers." '24 5 The Court also said that "Virginia 'as sovereign' did not have a
'clearly articulated policy' designed to displace price competition among
lawyers." 2
This reasoning is contradicted by both Southern Motor Carriers itself
and Goldfarb. It is inconsistent with the holding in Southern Motor Car-
riers because the standard applied there is whether the legislature clearly
intended to "displace competition in a particular field with a regulatory
structure,"'247 not whether it intended to eradicate competition entirely
or displace a certain kind of competition.24 The Court's characteriza-
tion of Goldfarb is inaccurate because there the state supreme court did
not authorize the restraints effected by the state and county bar associa-
tions,2 49 but it certainly displaced competitive freedom in pricing legal
services."' This characterization parallels the Court's analysis of the
Mississippi case in Southern Motor Carriers.25" ' In Goldfarb, the Court's
point was that the supreme court had not approved the particular type of
price restraint at issue, not that the defendant agency had interfered with
perfect pricing freedom."'
245. 471 U.S. at 64 (emphasis in original).
246. Id at 61.
247. Idl at 64.
248. The usage of this phrase in Southern Motor Carriers shows that the Court uses
"displace" to refer to the partial displacement of competition. See, e.g., 471 U.S. at 65 &
n.25. None of the four states entirely displaced competition in intrastate trucking; in-
deed, none of them displaced even price competition entirely, for even firms which were
members of the rate bureaus were free to file their own rates. Id. at 51.
249. It did not "direct" either bar association to issue fee schedules or "require the
type of price floor which arose from [their] activities," and it advised attorneys not to be
guided exclusively by such schedules. Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 790 & 789 n.19.
250. In rules issued in 1938, the Virginia Supreme Court prescribed to attorneys a
"procedure for setting fees" using enumerated factors, among which was "'customary
charges of the Bar for similar services,'" and approved consultation of bar association
advisory minimum fee schedules for this purpose. Id at 789 n. 19 (quoting Rules for the
Integration of the Virginia State Bar, 171 Va. xvii, xxiii (1938)). In 1970 the court
adopted a rule stating that "'[s]uggested fee schedules and economic reports of state and
local bar associations provide some guidance on the subject of reasonable fees.' "421 U.S.
at 789 n.19 (quoting Code of Professional Responsibility, 211 Va. 295, 302 (1970)).
251. See supra notes 221-28 and accompanying text. There, the Court inferred that
"the legislature intended to displace competition in the intrastate trucking industry with
a regulatory program" from the lack of a "discernible relationship" between the actual
prices and "the prices that would be set by a perfectly efficient and unregulated market."
Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 65 n.25. Given the Virginia Supreme Court's rules,
the state bar would not have been free, any more than the public service commission in
Mississippi, to "choose free market competition" in pricing. See id.
Indeed, the regulated price-setting activity in Goldfarb was even more anticompetitive
than that in Southern Motor Carriers. In Southern Motor Carriers, a trucker's participa-
tion in the rates filed by the trucker's rate bureaus was entirely voluntary. 471 U.S. at 50-
51. In Goldfarb, Virginia attorneys faced potential sanctions for ignoring the pricing
standards issued by the local bar associations. See supra note 242.
252. Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 789-91; see Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 60 ("focal
point of the Goldfarb opinion was the source of the anticompetitive policy" (emphasis in
original)).
The Court made a similar distinction in Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Car-
bon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962), where it employed Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943),
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These three cases stand as concrete examples, drawn from the Court's
own experience, of nonsovereign government action that occurred in ar-
eas selected for regulation by the legislature or supreme court yet cannot
plausibly be said to implement sovereign state policy. These cases
demonstrate that the current displacement-of-competition version of the
policy requirement is less demanding than the Midcal version,253 and
that it fails to achieve the Court's objective of confining immunity to
restraints implementing state policy.
Of course, the mere fact that prior cases cannot be harmonized with
current doctrine is not remarkable. What is interesting here is the
Court's explicit assertion that its displacement-of-competition standard
version of the policy requirement, as applied in Southern Motor Carriers,
is equivalent to the Midcal version and comports with the results in
Goldfarb and City of Lafayette. 54 The Court clearly intends not to com-
as an analogy. See Continental Ore, 370 U.S. at 706-07. In Continental Ore, the Court
denied Parker v. Brown immunity to defendant's Canadian subsidiary, which had been
duly delegated to act as a purchasing agent of the Canadian government and, in the
lawful exercise of its discretion, had eliminated its competitor, Continental Ore, from the
vanadium ore market. Id. As a wartime measure, the Canadian government had estab-
lished the Office of Metals Controller and given it "broad powers to regulate the procure-
ment of the materials and to allocate them to industrial users." Id. at 702 n. 11. This
agency in turn delegated to Electro Met "the discretionary agency power to purchase and
allocate to Canadian industries all vanadium products required by them." Id. Electro
Met, in exercising this discretion, refused to purchase any ore from plaintiff. Id. at 695.
Such delegation and exercise of discretion did not violate Canadian law. Id. at 702 n. 11,
706.
The Court observed that "there is no indication that the Controller or any other official
within the structure of the Canadian Government approved or would have approved of
joint efforts to monopolize the production and sale of vanadium or directed that
purchases from Continental be stopped." Id. at 706. This lack of any affirmative policy
on the part of the higher authorities supporting the agent's anticompetitive action would
likewise dictate denial of immunity under Midcal. Cf. Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105.
The displacement-of-competition standard, however, would lead to a contrary result.
The Canadian government clearly intended to displace competition in the vanadium mar-
ket with a regulatory structure. Cf Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 64 (state in-
tended to displace competition among common carriers). The "details" of the
"inherently anticompetitive" metals allocation program were left to the discretion of the
Office of Metals Controller, which in turn duly delegated discretion to the purchasing
agent. Continental Ore, 370 U.S. at 702 n. 11; cf. Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 63-
64. The lack of higher government authorization, and indeed the patent unlikeliness that
such anticompetitive conduct would have been countenanced, would be irrelevant under
the displacement-of-competition analysis.
Although Continental Ore has not been mentioned in the Court's recent state action
opinions, it was cited by the Court as authority bearing on the scope of state action
immunity in Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 789-90, and Cantor, 428 U.S. at 593.
253. Of course, immunity would today depend upon a finding that both the policy and
supervision requirements of Midcal are satisfied. The purpose of discussing these three
pre-Midcal cases has to do with the policy requirement. According to the interpretation
of the Court's current supervision requirement presented here, see supra notes 90-94 and
accompanying text, however, it too would be satisfied in Goldfarb and in Continental Ore.
As for City of Lafayette, the Court no longer applies the supervision requirement where a
local government is the defendant. See Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 47.
254. See supra notes 134-35, 223, 240, 245 and accompanying text.
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promise what it required in Midcal. Despite the result in Southern Motor
Carriers, these assertions suggest that the Court is committed firmly to
the distinctive feature of the Midcal standard: that a nonsovereign gov-
ernment restraint must implement sovereign state policy in order to sup-
port imnunity.2 5
D. The Utility of Agencies and Cities to the State
The Court's second objective for the policy requirement-preserving
the usefulness of agencies and local government to the sovereign parts of
government-now merits attention.256  This objective recognizes the
state's need to delegate discretion to subordinate bodies in a way that
permits flexibility in the execution of state policies. It is plain that the
displacement-of-competition standard satisfies this objective: it supports
antitrust immunity for any actions that agencies or local government
could possibly conceive of or endorse, as long as those actions stay within
the designated sectors of the economy. In light of the foregoing conclu-
sion that the displacement-of-competition standard violates the court's
other objective-confining immunity to regulatory restraints that imple-
ment state policy-it is important to examine how much of a constraint
this second objective poses on the first. This Article's effort to reconcile
both of the Court's primary objectives can succeed only if a less deferen-
tial version of the policy requirement could still satisfy the Court's desire
to preserve the utility of agencies and cities as instruments of state policy.
The Court's declaration that "[i]f more detail than a clear intent to
displace competition were required of the legislature, States would find it
difficult to implement through regulatory agencies their anticompetitive
policies"2 7 is unrealistic. The Court's assertion rests on two premises.
First, the Court reasons that requiring from the legislature "more detail
than a clear intent to displace competition" means necessarily requiring
"express authorization for every action that an agency might find neces-
sary to effectuate state policy." 2 8 This is a false dichotomy in that it
excludes the role of inference in interpreting legislative purpose. For ex-
ample, the City of Lafayette plurality stated that "specific, detailed legis-
lative authorization" was not necessary for it to be "found 'from the
authority given a governmental entity to operate in a particular area, that
the legislature contemplated the kind of action complained of.' ,,'9 In
recognizing implied, as well as express, authorization, then, the City of
255. This discussion, in contrasting abstract statements and concrete rules and results,
treats the Court's statements about its objectives as primary, rather than as rationaliza-
tion put together to support a rule. The Court's expression of its objectives has changed
little in the past decade, while the policy requirement has changed greatly. See supra
notes 180-88 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 184-86 and accompanying text.
257. Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 64.
258. Id.
259. City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 415 (quoting opinion below, 532 F.2d 431, 434 (5th
Cir. 1976)).
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Lafayette standard exemplifies a version of the policy requirement falling
between the displacement-of-competition standard and an express au-
thorization standard.
Second, the Court has suggested that policy decisions more detailed
than whether or not to displace competition in a particular field with
regulation fall within the realm of "problems unforeseeable to, or outside
the competence of, the legislature." 2" If this were true, the phrase "in-
tent to displace competition" properly would be viewed not as an ab-
stract description of legislative intent, but as a precise, concrete
characterization of that intent. It is wildly unrealistic, however, to imag-
ine that legislatures confine their policymaking to the general decision
whether or not to institute regulation, delegating the resolution of every
question more specific than that. The Court's own opinions are replete
with instances of regulatory statutes whose detail reflects substantially
deeper deliberation than this.26 Since the Court never has suggested any
dissatisfaction with the results of its previous cases, it would seem that
this apprehension of interfering unduly with the implementation of state
policies is substantially exaggerated. There are, of course, "problems un-
foreseeable to, or outside the competence of, the legislature," '262 but it is
highly counter-intuitive to say that this class of problems begins where
the decision whether or not to regulate a market ends.263
In sum, it would appear that the displacement-of-competition version
of the policy requirement does too little for one of the two opposing
objectives the Court seeks to achieve with its policy requirement, and
more than is needed for the other. A basic premise underlying the
Court's procedural test is that antitrust goals should be compromised
only to the extent necessary to realize sovereign state policies.2 '4 The
Court has asserted that the displacement-of-competition standard ac-
complishes this objective.2 65 The extreme liberality of the displacement-
of-competition standard, however, supports immunity for restraints
which do not implement state policy. Although the Court's displace-
260. Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 64.
261. See 324 Liquor Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 722-23 & nn. 1, 3 (statute provided detailed
system for resale price maintenance among wholesalers and retailers of liquor); Midcal,
445 U.S. at 99-100 & nn. 1-2 (same); Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 63 & n.24
(three of the four states concerned had statutes specifically authorizing collective rate-
making among common carriers); New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S.
96, 98 & n.1 (1978) (statute provided for agency review of proposed retail automobile
dealerships to be located in an area of existing franchise); Parker, 317 U.S. at 346-47
(statute set forth procedures and substantive criteria for establishment of programs con-
trolling agricultural marketing). The cases also demonstrate that state supreme courts
conceive and express their regulatory intentions in terms far more detailed than mono-
lithic concepts of competition and regulation. See Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 561-
64 (1984); Bates, 433 U.S. at 355 & n.5; Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 789 & n.19.
262. Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 64.
263. See supra notes 207-15 and accompanying text.
264. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
265. See Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 64; supra notes 195-96 and accompany-
ing text.
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ment-of-competition standard satisfies the Court's other principal objec-
tive-to protect the states' ability to use agencies and local government
as tools of state regulatory policy-it goes too far. A less generous ver-
sion of the policy requirement could satisfy this objective, while staying
within the confines of the first objective.
III. RECONCILIATION
A. A Proposed Standard
The previous section has shown that the Court's displacement-of-com-
petition version of the policy requirement is premised upon a misconcep-
tion of its practical context. The Court has underestimated the degree of
restriction needed to confine immunity to restraints implementing state
policy. At the same time, the Court has overestimated the danger of
frustrating the necessary delegation of state authority to state agencies
and local government by rejecting out-of-hand any version of the policy
requirement more demanding than the displacement-of-competition
standard.
The goal of this Article is to state a version of the policy requirement
that can satisfy both of the Court's objectives: granting immunity only
where the regulatory restraint furthers state policy and simultaneously
permitting the use of agencies and cities as flexible tools for state policy.
The Midcal policy requirement-"the challenged restraint must be 'one
clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy,' " 266-- is a
good starting point. It needs to be clarified, however, so that courts do
not interpret it as giving carte blanche to agency and municipal anticom-
petitive initiatives based on a simple finding that the state intended to
displace competition with regulation. The policy requirement should ask
not simply whether the state intended to impose regulation in this field,
but whether it intended to impose in that field the type of regulation in
267issue.
The proposed test requires that the pertinent sovereign policy must
indicate not only that regulation is to displace competition in the particu-
lar field, but also must indicate affirmatively a policy to displace competi-
tion in the form and magnitude presented by the challenged restraint.
This fundamental question of the intended impact on competition must
be resolved if the Midcal policy requirement is to fulfill its purpose. If
the restraint imposed by the city or agency displaces competition in a
way or to a degree not articulated by the state, it should not be deemed to
satisfy the policy requirement.
266. See California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S.
97, 105 (1980) (quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389,
415 (1978) (plurality opinion)); see also City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 415 (plurality opin-
ion) (requiring that "'the legislature contemplated the kind of action complained of' )
(quoting opinion below, 532 F.2d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 1976)).
267. See supra notes 206-17 and accompanying text.
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The Court's opinions provide examples of an appropriate level of gen-
eralization in characterizing the state's regulatory policy. In Midcal it-
self, the challenged regulation satisfied the policy requirement for
immunity because the legislature's policy was "forthrightly stated and
clear in its purpose to permit resale price maintenance." '268 In 324 Li-
quor Corp. v. Duffy, 269 too, the Court identified the State's policy of "re-
sale price maintenance. '270 In contrast, in Goldfarb, because the state
supreme court had not acted to "authorize binding price fixing,"' 271 that
form of regulatory restraint was denied immunity. And in Continental
Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., the Court denied immunity
because no government policy permitted an agency to participate in
"joint efforts to monopolize" the industry in question.272
Although a court should consider "'all evidence which might show
the scope of legislative intent,' ",273 inferences should be drawn narrowly.
State policy relied on to validate nonsovereign regulatory restraints
should be affirmatively discernible in the governmental entity's grant of
authority. Certain canons of interpretation inevitably would play a part,
but these should not rubberstamp agency or city innovations as imple-
menting state policy. As Professors Areeda and Turner have suggested,
a court should apply "the presumption that competition serves a state's
interests unless it has fairly clearly expressed a contrary view. "274 City of
Lafayette and Town of Hallie may be usefully compared. In City of La-
fayette, where the statute merely provided for municipal operation of
utilities,275 the plurality distinguished between authorization "to provide
268. 445 U.S. at 105.
269. 107 S. Ct. 720, 725 (1987).
270. Id. at 725.
271. 421 U.S. at 789. The Court had displaced purely competitive pricing, however, in
other respects. See supra notes 249-52. A similar degree of precision in characterizing
state regulatory policy is found in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n,
322 U.S. 533 (1944). There the Court noted that states regulated the insurance business,
but it observed that few states permitted unsupervised insurance companies to fix uniform
rates and that no states authorized "combinations of insurance companies to coerce, in-
timidate, and boycott competitors and consumers in the manner here alleged." Id. at
562, (quoted in Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S.
48, 55 n.18 (1985)); see infra notes 308-17 and accompanying text.
272. Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 706 (1962).
See supra note 252.
273. City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 394 (quoting opinion below, 532 F.2d 431, 435 (5th
Cir. 1976)).
274. 1 P. Areeda & D. Turner, Antitrust Law % 214, at 81 (1978); see id. at 83 (con-
strues Cantor to hold that "unless the state is explicit about which activities are part of its
regulatory plan, the Court will assume that activities which conflict with the antitrust
laws are not part of the plan for purposes of antitrust immunity"); Douglas & Mullenix,
supra note 7, at 521 (when evidence of legislative intent is "equally consistent with a state
purpose that is not in conflict with federal law," a purpose to displace the antitrust laws
should not be found); id. at 520 (principles of federalism "run in both directions: just as
an intent to preempt state laws is not lightly inferred from congressional action, so an
anticompetitive policy that would undermine federal law should not be lightly inferred
from state laws").
275. 435 U.S. at 391.
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services on a monopoly basis" and "predatory conduct not itself directed
by the State." '2 76 In Town of Hallie, in contrast, statutes not only author-
ized the defendant city to operate sewage services, but specifically per-
mitted it to refuse to extend services to adjacent unincorporated areas."7
It was thus appropriate to grant immunity. To be consistent with Mid-
cal, the Court in Southern Motor Carriers should not have inferred that
Mississippi's legislature intended to authorize collective ratefiling among
motor carriers when it had only explicitly authorized rate regulation. 78
Collective ratefiling is hardly necessary to rate regulation and has a sepa-
rate and substantial incremental impact on competition.2" 9
The proposed version of the policy requirement would confine anti-
trust immunity to restraints that, in a meaningful sense, implement pol-
icy of a sovereign part of the state and would thus eliminate the un-
necessary concession of immunity to anticompetitive innovation by agen-
cies and local governments. It must also be determined whether the pro-
posed standard would hamper the use of agencies and local government
as tools of state policy.280 Indeed, it was concern that the City of Lafay-
ette and Midcal versions of the policy requirement would not sufficiently
protect this objective that seems to have motivated the Court to evolve
the displacement-of-competition standard.
The proposed standard would not require express authorization for
specific regulatory actions. It would not require that the legislature or
supreme court approve the details of individual actions or mean that
state action would be found only where the sovereign parts of govern-
ment makes all policy decisions and the nonsovereign none.28  The pro-
posed standard would permit the delegation of considerable discretion,
including policymaking power, to agencies and local government, as long
as the legislature or other pertinent sovereign body has answered the very
fundamental question of the kind of anticompetitive impact permitted by
the regulation.
It is unrealistic to assume that legislatures are incapable, unwilling or
unlikely to consider regulatory issues in any more depth than the black
and white issue of whether or not to introduce regulation 28 2 or that states
276. 435 U.S. at 405 n.31. See supra notes 236-41 and accompanying text.
277. Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 41; see infra notes 304-09 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 223-34 and accompanying text.
279. To authorize rate regulation does not suggest an intention to authorize collective
ratefiling any more than it suggests an intention that a single firm be granted a monopoly
in the field. Rate regulation simply means that providers file their rates with a regulatory
commission for whatever review the latter chooses to administer. Where collective rate
filing is permitted, groups of competitors agree in advance to charge the same rates, and
file these rates collectively.
280. See supra notes 185-86, 256-63 and accompanying text.
281. This substantially differs from the nondelegation doctrine in administrative law,
which opposes the delegation of any legislative power to agencies. See I K. Davis, Ad-
ministrative Law Treatise §§ 204-06 (2d ed. 1978); B. Schwartz, Administrative Law 52-
55 (2d ed. 1984).
282. See supra notes 260-63 and accompanying text.
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generally would wish to eliminate completely the place of federal anti-
trust laws in the regulatory sector.2 83 As is demonstrated below, almost
all of the regulatory actions of state or local government to which the
Court has granted immunity also would receive immunity under the pro-
posed test.284 It therefore seems most unlikely that the proposed stan-
dard would make it "difficult" for states "to implement through
regulatory agencies their anticompetitive policies," '285 or reduce "the
range of regulatory alternatives available to the State, '286 or "compro-
mise the States' ability to regulate their domestic commerce. '287  It
would leave a state "'no less able to allocate governmental power be-
tween itself and its political subdivisions.' "288
B. Consistency With Precedent
Aside from its substantive objectives, the Court also has emphasized
the value of maintaining consistency within its state action cases. 28 9 The
proposed version of the policy requirement yields results consistent with
those of virtually all of the Court's state action cases.
A number of the Court's cases can be treated very briefly. Restraints
imposed by a sovereign part of state government-a legislature or
supreme court-are deemed to represent state policy without further in-
283. See supra notes 212-13 and accompanying text.
284. See infra notes 291-322 and accompanying text.
285. See Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 64.
286. See id. at 61; Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40,
56-57 (1982).
287. See Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 56. The proposed rule would frustrate
only those hypothetical legislative policies that are so vaguely expressed as to be indis-
cernible. If this should occur, legislatures would be able to circumvent the problem by
expressing themselves somewhat more clearly in delegating discretion. The proposed test
would, of course, frustrate those anticompetitive restraints formulated by an agency or
city on its own, with no substantial basis in expressed legislative policy. This follows
from the restrictive concept of state action immunity repeatedly expressed by the Court:
agency and city action must implement sovereign-level policy. See supra notes 82-84 and
accompanying text.
288. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 57 (1982)
(quoting City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 416). As explained by the Court in City of Boul-
der, an inquiry into whether nonsovereign restraints implement state policy
does not threaten the legitimate exercise of governmental power, nor does it
preclude municipal government from providing services on a monopoly basis.
Parker and its progeny make clear that a State properly may . . . direct or
authorize its instrumentalities to act in a way which, if it did not reflect state
policy, would be inconsistent with the antitrust laws .... [A]ssuming that the
municipality is authorized to provide a service on a monopoly basis, these limi-
tations on municipal action will not hobble the execution of legitimate govern-
mental programs.
Id. at 57 (quoting City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 416-17).
289. That this is an independent objective is suggested by instances in which the Court
has substantially distorted the language or facts of its own prior cases in order to preserve
the appearance of doctrinal continuity. See supra notes 48, 88-89, 125-32, 134-35, 240-4 1,
245-52 and accompanying text.
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quiry.290 Therefore, the proposed modification of the policy requirement
would not affect the reasoning in the cases in which the Court deter-
mined that the restraint was imposed directly by a state supreme
court.29' The Court's policy requirement essentially applies only when
the challenged restraint is nonsovereign-that is, imposed by an agency
or a city.292 The proposed version would not disturb the state policy
aspect of cases in which a statute entirely defined the challenged re-
straint. 293 Nor is an issue raised by the proposed standard regarding the
cases in which agency or city regulation fails to meet even the displace-
290. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
291. See Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433
U.S. 350 (1977). In Bates the challenged restrictions on attorney advertising were con-
tained in disciplinary rules explicitly approved by the state supreme court. See id. at 360;,
see also supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
In Hoover, the Court granted immunity to the actions of the Arizona Supreme Court's
Committee on Examinations and Admissions relating to the scoring of a bar examination
failed by plaintiff. 466 U.S. at 560-67. It based this ruling on a not altogether convincing
determination that the pertinent conduct was that of the state supreme court itself. Com-
pare id. at 561-65, 570-90 (Committee's recommendation cannot "be divorced from the
[state] Supreme Court's exercise of its sovereign powers") with id. at 593-96 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (supreme court did not even have a "clearly articulated state policy" sufficient
to uphold anticompetitive ruling). Although the committee was supposed to file its grad-
ing formula with the supreme court for its approval, it apparently had not done so for the
examination in question. See id, at 562 & n.6, 572 & n.22.
The same result, however, might also be reached in another way. The supreme court
had formed the committee and given it certain powers, id at 561-62 & n.4; like the bar
association in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, "its role [was] completely defined by the
court." Bates, 433 U.S. at 361. Treating the committee like any other agency, the policy
requirement would be met as long as the committee's actions, if not reviewed in this
instance, were at least of the type specified by the supreme court in its delegation of
authority to the committee. Apparently they were. See Hoover, 466 U.S. at 594 (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (supreme court "may have permitted petitioners to grade and score respon-
dent's bar examination as they did"). This conclusion would follow under the proposed
version of the policy requirement as well as under the displacement-of-competition
version.
292. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
293. See 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 107 S. Ct. 720 (1987); Southern Motor Carriers,
471 U.S. at 65 (as to three of the four states concerned); Midcal, 445 U.S. at 97; New
Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978).
In New Motor Vehicle Board, the challenged actions of the agency followed procedures
set forth in a detailed statute providing for regulatory review of the establishment or
relocation of retail automobile dealerships within the market area of an existing fran-
chisee of the same manufacturer. See 439 U.S. at 98 & n.1; supra notes 116-18 and ac-
companying text. The Court subsequently has referred to New Motor Vehicle Board as an
example of regulatory discretion. See Hoover, 466 U.S. at 568; Town of Hallie, 471 U.S.
at 42. Plaintiff's suit, however, apparently only challenged the delay pending review,
rather than the review itself. See New Motor Vehicle Board, 439 U.S. at 109 (appellees
"argue that by delaying the establishment of automobile dealerships whenever competing
dealers protest, the state scheme gives effect to privately initiated restraints on trade"); id.
at 112 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("[tihis litigation arises because of the delay necessarily
incident to the Board's inquiry"). Only one of the 117 protests filed under the Act had
ever been sustained by the Board, id, at 110 n. 14, so the Act's function in practice was
delay rather than prohibition. The due process issue, similarly, concerned only the delay
without prior hearing. See id. at 106-09; 440 F. Supp. 436 passim (C.D. Cal. 1977) (opin-
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ment-of-competition standard. 94 The Court's other state action cases
merit individual discussion.
The challenged restraint held immune in Parker v. Brown was enforce-
ment of a regional raisin marketing program developed under a Califor-
nia statute.295 Although Parker sometimes is referred to as if the
restraint were formulated entirely by the legislature,296 the opinion shows
that the regulatory program received its final form from an agency and
that the Court analyzed it as such. 29 7 The statute delegated to an agency,
the Agricultural Prorate Advisory Commission, policymaking discretion
as to whether to develop marketing programs for particular commodities
and the precise form and scale such programs should assume.298 The
Court read the statute as a "state command to the Commission and to
ion below). As to this delay, the agency exercised no discretion. See New Motor Vehicle
Bd., 439 U.S. at 98 & n.1, 103.
The Court noted that "the Board has the authority to order an immediate hearing on a
dealer protest if it concludes that the public interest so requires" and that "It]he duration
of interim restraint" therefore was "subject to ongoing regulatory supervision." Id. at
110. This would shorten, but not remove, the automatic delay complained of. It does not
appear that plaintiffs had ever requested such an exercise of the Board's discretion, or
that they referred to this point in their lawsuit.
In Midcal, the Court determined that the challenged statute, which imposed resale
price maintenance procedures on liquor wholesalers, satisfied the state policy requirement
but not the active supervision requirement. 445 U.S. at 105-06; see supra notes 120-23 and
accompanying text. Similarly, in 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, the challenged liquor pricing
statute was determined by the Court to satisfy the policy requirement but not the active
supervision requirement. 107 S. Ct. at 725 (citing Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105). Also, in
Southern Motor Carriers, statutes in three of the four states specifically required or per-
mitted the public service commission to permit motor carriers to jointly file rate tariffs,
471 U.S. at 63, failing to meet the active supervision requirement.
294. See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976); City of Boulder, 455 U.S.
40.
In Cantor, although the commission's authority to approve a tariff regarding light
bulbs had not been challenged, the Court observed that "[t]he distribution of electric light
bulbs in Michigan is unregulated." 428 U.S. at 584. See id. at 584-85 (Court inferred
that "the State's policy [was] neutral on the question whether a utility should, or should
not, have such a program," because neither the legislature nor the commission had ever
investigated "the desirability of a lamp-exchange program or of its possible effect on com-
petition in the lightbulb market"); supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text; see also
Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 64 (immunity in Cantor denied "because the Michi-
gan Legislature had indicated no intention to displace competition in the relevant mar-
ket") (citing Cantor, 428 U.S. at 584-85). In City of Boulder, the Court found that the
state of Colorado had not addressed the question of municipal regulation of cable televi-
sion at all. 455 U.S. at 55; see Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 43; supra note 126 and accom-
panying text.
295. 317 U.S. 341, 344 (1943). See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
296. Hoover, 466 U.S. at 588 (Stevens, J., dissenting); City of Boulder, 455 U.S. at 52;
Jorde, supra note 10, at 241.
297. Parker, 317 U.S. at 346-48, 350-52.
298. Id. at 346-47. This included the tasks of determining what were reasonable prof-
its and determining the reasonableness of a committee's proposed marketing program
and of any proposed subsequent modification. Id. at 348-49. Approval depended upon a
finding that the program was "reasonably calculated to carry out the objectives of the
Act." Id. at 347; see Brown v. Parker, 39 F. Supp. 895, 901 (S.D. Cal. 1941) (refers to
"'Stabilization Pool Sales Policy' set up by the Committee").
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the program committee." '29 9 As the Court noted, the Commission was
responsible for the final form of the programs."° Using the Court's ter-
minology, the restraint in question was "official action directed by a
state," rather than "state action" in the narrower sense. 30 1
At the same time, however, the challenged restraints approved by the
agency followed parameters clearly defined by the statute and thus would
satisfy the proposed version of the policy requirement. The legislature
established the general form and content of the challenged restraint in
the statute, setting forth detailed procedures leading up to the approval
of an agricultural marketing plan and defining the structural elements
from which the plans might be composed. 0 2 Notwithstanding the Com-
mission's discretion, the anticompetitive impact of the Commission's
programs fell within a range authorized by the legislature. In approving
the particular anticompetitive restraints embodied in the marketing pro-
gram of Raisin Proration Zone No. 1, the Commission did not add any
form of anticompetitive restraint not contemplated by the legislature.30 3
The proposed standard would also support granting immunity to the
defendant city in Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, as the Supreme
Court did.3°  At issue was the city's refusal to furnish sewage treatment
service to adjoining unincorporated townships unless they agreed to be-
come annexed to the city and thus accept sewage collection and transpor-
tation service along with the sewage treatment service.3 5 A combination
of state statutes specifically permitted the city to refuse to extend sewage
299. 317 U.S. at 352. The Agricultural Prorate Advisory Commission was to pass
upon and oversee marketing programs initiated by committees of agricultural producers.
Id at 346. If statutorily prescribed economic criteria were met, including a finding by the
Commission that development of a program would not allow producers "unreasonable
profits," a "program committee" was to be named, principally from nominees proposed
by the producers. Id The program committee then would formulate a particular prora-
tion marketing program for the designated commodity in the defined zone and submit it
for review to the Commission, which had the power to modify it. Id at 347.
300. 317 U.S. at 347. See Midcal, 445 U.S. at 104 ("The Court emphasized [in Parker]
that the Advisory Commission, which was appointed by the Governor, had to approve
cooperative policies .... ").
301. Parker, 317 U.S. at 351. The Court characterized the pertinent statute as author-
izing "the establishment, through action of state officials, of programs for the marketing of
agricultural commodities." Id at 346 (emphasis added).
302. The primary administrative task of the marketing committee was the grading of
the crop and its allocation into pools. I, at 347-48. Marketing of the raisins was to be
controlled or performed by the committee through control of the pools. Id at 348. Even
for free tonnage, which a producer was allowed to sell through ordinary commercial
channels, the producer had to purchase a "secondary certificate" authorizing sale; certifi-
cation permitted the committee to control the "time and volume of movement." Ia
Definition of, and plans for, the administration of the pools were to be specified in the
proposal a committee submitted to the Commission. See 1939 Cal. Stat. 2497.
303. The interpretation that Parker embodies the displacement-of-competition stan-
dard is implicitly rebutted by the detail the Court devotes to explaining how closely com-
mission action fit expressed legislative policy. The Court's detailed discussion of these
points would be superfluous under the displacement-of-competition standard.
304. 471 U.S. at 47.
305. Id at 37.
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service to areas that would not accept annexation.3 °6 The conclusion
that the legislature had contemplated municipal action of precisely the
type challenged was supported by a state supreme court decision ren-
dered in a similar case.30 7
The proposed standard would support the Court's denial of immunity
in Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp.308 Defendant's
subsidiary had been duly delegated to act as a purchasing agent of the
Canadian government; its choice of suppliers technically fell within the
range of its discretion. 30 9 Although some displacement of competition
was inherent in a program of government purchasing and allocation,
none of the higher authorities had ever expressed any policy that would
support the agent's actions in systematically excluding a rival from the
Canadian vanadium market. The Court relied on this point in denying
immunity. 10
The proposed standard also would confirm the Court's denial of im-
munity in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar 3 1 and in Lafayette v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co.312 In Goldfarb, the state supreme court had displaced
competition to the extent of directing attorneys to consider enumerated
factors, including bar association advisory fee schedules, in determining
their fees.313 The bar association's active discouragement of offering
prices below those suggested in the schedules, however, did not warrant
immunity because this additional anticompetitive conduct had not been
authorized by the state supreme court.314 In City of Lafayette, the pro-
306. See id. at 41. The basic statutory grant of authority to cities to construct and
enlarge sewer systems permitted cities to determine their own service districts. Id. A
more detailed statute recited that a city would have no obligation to serve unincorporated
areas beyond the boundary the city chose for its service district. id. A third statute,
which authorized the state's Department of Natural Resources to order a city to provide
sewage connections to areas outside its district, specifically provided that such an order
would be void if the area refused to accept annexation. Id. Thus, even if the townships
had applied to the state's Department of Natural Resources for relief, the statute specifi-
cally forbade the agency to order a connection in the circumstances. See id.
307. 471 U.S. at 44 & n.8.
308. 370 U.S. at 704.
309. See supra note 252.
310. The Court observed that "there is no indication that the Controller or any other
official within the structure of the Canadian Government approved or would have ap-
proved of joint efforts to monopolize the production and sale of vanadium or directed
that purchases from Continental be stopped." 370 U.S. at 706.
311. 421 U.S. at 791. The Court denied immunity in this case, reasoning that anticom-
petitive conduct of the bar associations had not been compelled by the state supreme
court. Id. at 790. Its factual discussion, however, went well beyond what would have
been necessary merely to support this rationale and drew attention to factors that support
denial of immunity under the proposed rule. See infra note 314 and accompanying text.
312. 435 U.S. at 413-17 (plurality opinion).
313. See 421 U.S. at 778 n.6, 782-83, 791 n.21; see supra note 250 and accompanying
text. At issue was an advisory minimum fee schedule issued by a county bar association
patterned after a state bar's fee schedule and indirectly enforced by the state bar's ethical
pronouncements on the topic of fees.
314. The state bar association issued opinions and reports that indicated that pricing
below the advisory fee schedule was a violation of professional ethics meriting discipli-
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posed standard leads to the same result reached by the Court for essen-
tially the reasons relied on by the plurality.31 5 The legislature had
displaced competition to the extent of authorizing cities to own and oper-
ate electrical utilities, 3 6 but there was no further showing that it had
intended municipal utilities to undertake rivalrous exclusionary practices
with respect to neighboring utilities as alleged.31
In Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc v. United States318
alone, application of the proposed standard yields results that deviate
slightly from the Court's decision. In Southern Motor Carriers, the pro-
posed policy requirement would grant immunity, as the Court did, for
the activities of the rate bureaus in three of the four states, because the
statutes explicitly permitted the specific type of anticompetitive restraint
presented--collective filing of tariffs by associations of motor carriers.3 1 9
The proposed standard would deny immunity in the case of Mississippi,
however, because of the lack of legislative policy supporting collective
rate filing. 2° By permitting collective rate filing, the Mississippi commis-
sion displaced competition to a substantially greater extent than was in-
dicated by the legislative direction to set "just and reasonable" rates for
motor carriers.321 At the same time, because this opinion vigorously in-
vokes the Midcal version of the policy requirement, much of its reason-
ing supports the version proposed here. 32
This survey demonstrates that the proposed policy requirement does
nary action. See supra note 242 and accompanying text. The Court emphasized that
there was no indication that the supreme court approved the bar's opinions. 421 U.S. at
791.
Indeed, the supreme court had affirmatively expressed policy contrary to that of the
state bar. Whereas the bar's opinions and reports threatened that undercutting the advi-
sory schedules could constitute misconduct, the court downplayed the importance of the
schedule. The court's rule mentions fee schedules only as evidence of "customary
charges," and customary charges formed only one of six factors a lawyer was to consider
in setting his fee. Id at 789 n.19. Moreover, the court's rules expressly warned that "no
lawyer shouldpermit himself to be controlled" by a fee schedule or to "follow it as his sole
guide in determining the amount of his fee." Id. (emphasis in quotation added by
Supreme Court). Similarly, the bar's ethical opinion warning lawyers not to criticize
publicly other lawyers who charged in excess of the recommended fees, id. at 777 n.4,
may be contrasted with the state supreme court's rule against charging "excessive" fees,
id at 789 n.19.
315. See 435 U.S. at 413-16 (plurality opinion); supra notes 109-14 and accompanying
text.
316. 435 U.S. at 391-92.
317. Id at 414-15. No evidence demonstrated that the legislature had "'contemplated
the kind of action complained of.'" Id at 415 (quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co., 532 F.2d 431,434 (5th Cir. 1976)). For a discussion of the exclusion-
ary conduct in issue, see 435 U.S. at 392 n.6, 403-05; see supra notes 236-37 and accompa-
nying text.
318. 471 U.S. 48 (1985).
319. Id at 63.
320. As the Court itself stated, the public service commission, "[a]cting alone.. . could
not immunize private anticompetitive conduct." Id. at 62-63.
321. Id. at 63.
322. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
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not disturb the results in the Court's state action cases except as to one of
the four states in Southern Motor Carriers. In contrast, as was shown
above, the Court's current displacement-of-competition standard contra-
dicts the results reached in City of Lafayette, Goldfarb and Continental
Ore,32 3 and in Southern Motor Carriers clashes with the Midcal policy
requirement it purports to construe. 3 4 Thus from the standpoint of the
Court's implicit objective of maintaining consistency among its own
precedents, 325 the proposed version of the state policy requirement is su-
perior to the displacement-of-competition standard.
C. Efficiency Consequences
This Article has demonstrated that the displacement-of-competition
version of the policy requirement fails to satisfy the Court's objective of
confining immunity to regulatory restraints that implement state policies
and has proposed in its place a stronger version that nonetheless meets
the Court's countervailing objective of permitting agencies and cities to
function effectively as tools of state policy. It remains to be shown that
what is doctrinally feasible is worthwhile-that the proposed version of
the policy requirement would yield an improvement in efficiency over the
Court's displacement-of-competition standard. The following discussion
demonstrates that the proposed standard would deny immunity to some
of the inefficient types of agency and city restraints that have provoked
the most concern among proponents of substantive criteria in this area.
In the context of the state action doctrine, scholarship addressing the
inefficiencies generated by regulation points to two principal problems.
326
First, there are inefficiencies caused when regulated entities are able to
exercise sufficient influence over the regulatory apparatus to obtain bene-
fits at the expense of the consuming public. Government regulation can
function as a valuable aid to, or substitute for cartelization, providing
regulated entities with such benefits as heightened entry barriers and the
discouragement of price competition.327 The opportunity for securing
323. See supra notes 236-53 and accompanying text.
324. See supra notes 223-35 and accompanying text.
325. See supra note 289 and accompanying text.
326. This is not to claim that all state and local regulation is inefficient, or more ineffi-
cient than federal regulation, or that it is a homogeneous category, or that identifying and
measuring such inefficiency is a straightforward task. Considerable controversy attends
the empirical study of regulatory inefficiency. See, e.g., Hovenkamp & Mackerron, supra
note 8, at 759-60. Description or prescription in this area presupposes generalization
over a highly disparate range of lines of commerce and state and local government insti-
tutions. But the need to impose a categorical treatment is in part imposed by the sweep
of the Sherman Act itself and by the desire to avoid overly complex or subtle legal rules.
327. See Easterbrook, supra note 8, at 23-24, 28-30; B. Owen & R. Braeutigam, The
Regulation Game 6 (1978); Page, supra note 10, at 1108-09; Werden & Balmer, Conflicts
Between State Law and the Sherman Act, 44 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1982); Wiley, supra
note 8, at 723-26. See also Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, supra note 198, at 63 ("The
delegation of legislative authority to agencies ... facilitates the regulatory production of
private benefits and the satisfaction of high demanders' preferences at collective cost").
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such private benefits arises especially when producer groups obtain effec-
tive self-regulation under government auspices; occupational licensing
programs are a notorious example.328
Second, there are inefficiencies that occur because the territory of the
regulating government body is substantially smaller than the market on
which the costs of its inefficient regulation are imposed.329 In effect, a
government unit's regulatory activities or its own conduct as a market
participant may benefit its citizens at the expense of noncitizens by "ex-
porting" costs beyond its borders. The opportunity to impose such ineffi-
ciencies is greatest when a government unit acts as a market participant
and effectively regulates its own proprietary operations.33a
In the context of state and local regulation, axiomatic points of the
Court's state action doctrine put much of this inefficiency out of reach,
even under the proposed version of the policy requirement. Regulation
directly carried out by a state legislature or supreme court, a sovereign
part of the state government, automatically is deemed immune under the
state action doctrine, regardless of any inefficiency. 33' By extension, inef-
ficient regulation that fits entirely within the scope of affirmatively identi-
fiable policies of the state legislature or supreme court also would be
deemed to satisfy the policy requirement. 332 But, a very substantial por-
tion of inefficient state and local regulation would be denied immunity
under the proposed version of the policy requirement because it displaces
competition in a way not supported by identifiable state regulatory
policy.
This last category of regulatory restraints-those that exceed the scope
of the legislative mandate-includes the instances in which the benefits of
regulation 333 have been captured through decisive influence or, in the
case of self-regulating producer groups and governmental proprietary op-
erations, outright control over the regulatory process rather than
through the legislative process. The displacement-of-competition version
of the policy requirement is well-suited to securing those benefits of ineffi-
cient regulation: if the legislature can be persuaded to initiate any form
of regulation, any subsequent regulatory restraint in that market will sat-
isfy the policy requirement.334 Such a pattern also enables legislators to
328. See Donnem, Federal Antitrust Law Versus Anticompetitive State Regulation, 39
Antitrust L.J. 950, 953-55 (1970); Werden & Balmer, supra note 327, at 4-5; Note, supra
note 200, at 1495-96.
329. See Easterbrook, supra note 8, at 46-49; Hovenkamp & Mackerron, supra note 8,
at 768-71; Levmore, supra note 17, at 627-28.
330. Although proprietary government operations most commonly are associated with
local government, some state agencies function as market participants. Werden &
Balmer, supra note 327, at 3; Note, supra note 200, at 1490.
331. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
332. See supra notes 266-74 and accompanying text. Of course, the portion of the
inefficiency problem attributable to sovereign action or policy would be equally unreach-
able using the displacement-of-competition version of the policy requirement.
333. See supra notes 327-28 and accompanying text.
334. See supra notes 174-76 and accompanying text. The enjoyment of such benefits
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pursue a "strategy of ambiguity" in their enactment of statutes.335 By
denying immunity to these regulatory restraints, the proposed standard
would remove these inefficiencies.336
The existence of a substantial overlap between agency and city regula-
tion that is inefficient and regulation that would be reachable under a
reinvigorated version of the Court's procedural test for immunity should
not be surprising in view of the origins of the policy requirement.
Although the Court's recent opinions have stressed the need to avoid
burdening the operation of agencies and cities as instruments of state
policy, 337 the earlier decisions out of which the policy requirement arose
express concern with the harmful potential of autonomous regulatory
policymaking by such nonsovereign entities.338
What is called for, of course, is an assessment of the likely net impact
of the proposed change in the policy requirement. If the stricter standard
were implemented, beneficiaries of such inefficient regulation could re-
ceive state action immunity only by obtaining from the state legislature
or supreme court a statute or rule affirmatively endorsing the desired
anticompetitive aspects of the regulation. If such beneficiaries were uni-
formly able to obtain the same benefits from the legislature, there would
be no practical benefit to implementing the more restrictive version of the
policy requirement. Therefore, it is necessary to assess the relative ame-
nability of the legislative process to providing the kind of inefficiency
benefits currently being derived from agencies and local government.
Professor Wiley suggests that "state legislatures are no less prone to
receives further protection when the burden to seek a contrary resolution from the legis-
lature falls on a dispersed class of persons with little individual incentive to join together.
Page, supra note 10, at 1112-13.
335. See Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, supra note 198, at 39, 60.
336. Restraints imposed by cities or agencies in fields not chosen for regulation by the
state would be denied immunity under either the proposed version of the policy require-
ment or the Court's displacement-of-competition version. See supra note 176 and accom-
panying text. Here, as elsewhere, this discussion makes no effort to predict the Court's
ultimate reconciliation of the relation between the state action doctrine and the preemp-
tion doctrine. See supra note 78.
337. See supra notes 257-58 and accompanying text.
338. In Goldfarb, the Court rejected a standard that would have given the bar associa-
tion, a state agency, "an antitrust shield that allows it to foster anticompetitive practices
for the benefit of its members." 421 U.S. at 791. See also Asheville Tobacco Bd. of Trade
v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 263 F.2d 502, 509-10 (4th Cir. 1959) (action of tobacco board
of trade, although technically action of state agency, was effectively "individual action
masquerading as state action") (cited in Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105 n.8). In Cantor, consid-
ering a tariff submitted by a utility company and approved by a state public service com-
mission, the Court noted that "the option to have, or not to have, such a program is
primarily respondent's, not the Commission's." 428 U.S. at 594 & n.31. In City of La-
fayette, the Court commented at length on local governments' capacity "as owners and
providers of services" for "aggrandizing other economic units with which they interre-
late," 435 U.S. at 408, each dedicated to "realizing maximum benefits to itself without
regard to extra-territorial impact." Id. at 404. This impact would fall most directly on
"[m]ulcted consumers" living outside the city boundaries and on "unfairly displaced
competitors," id. at 406, and might also impair "regional efficiency." Id. at 404; see id. at
403.
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producer capture than are administrative agencies. ' 339  Under the
Court's current displacement-of-competition test, however, the relative
vulnerability of legislative and regulatory processes to capture is hardly
put to the test. Captors do not need legislative endorsement for any as-
pect of their program beyond the idea of a program-that is, endorse-
ment of some kind of regulation in the given field. 3 ' Any agency or city
restraint ordinarily presupposes that minimal degree of legislative sup-
port. There are reasons, however, to expect that state legislatures would
be substantially less prone than agencies or cities to endorse the specific
type and magnitude of the desired regulatory displacement of competi-
tion, as required by the proposed version of the policy requirement.
The Local Government Antitrust Act hearings are suggestive on this
point. Both local government witnesses and state government witnesses
indicated that state legislatures had given immunity to a narrower scope
of municipal restraints than local government wished and that they
would continue to do so. 34' State government witnesses endorsed the
goals of the antitrust laws and indicated that the states themselves would
be sensitive to the benefits of competition in regulated markets." 2
Whatever disinclination legislatures might have felt to rubberstamp mu-
nicipal regulatory policies before enactment of the Local Government
Antitrust Act, would likely be even greater today. At the time, local
governments apparently were liable for antitrust damages, which ulti-
mately would be borne by their citizens, and it might be expected that
consideration of this risk would have been given some weight by the leg-
islature. Today, in contrast, only injunctive relief is at stake. 3 More-
over, if directly elected city governments experience such limited success
in securing legislative endorsement of their policies, the regulatory bu-
reaucracies, especially those most closely identified with industry inter-
ests, arguably would meet with even less sympathy.3 "
More generally, certain features of the regulatory process associated
with capture would not carry over into the legislative process. Perhaps
the most obvious such feature is that much bureaucratic regulation is
essentially self-regulation. 4  A municipal utility or a profession gov-
erned by its own occupational licensing board does not have to persuade
outside bureaucrats to adopt favorable policies. The proposed test would
339. Wiley, supra note 8, at 733. He reasons that the superior effectiveness of concen-
trated producer groups "logically applies with at least as much force to the capture of
legislators as to the capture of bureaucrats" and that the "host of... capture mechanisms
... can work as least as well on elected as [on] appointed officials." Id. at 732 & n.92; see
also Wiley, supra note 188, at 1280 n.18.
340. See supra notes 174-77, 334-35 and accompanying text.
341. See supra note 163.
342. See supra notes 161-62.
343. See supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
344. Cf Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 45 & n.9 (municipalities subject to mandatory
disclosure regulations and whose officers are elected are subject to public scrutiny that
may protect against antitrust abuses).
345. See supra notes 327-30 and accompanying text.
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force self-governing professions and industries and government units
functioning as market participants to shift from self-persuasion to per-
suading a legislature, a considerable leap. Even for producer groups that
obtain their inefficient regulation the hard way, in the sense that outsid-
ers regulate them, it should be more difficult to persuade a legislature to
endorse specific anticompetitive conduct than to persuade an agency to
do the same thing.3 46 Regulatory agencies commonly develop a solici-
tude for the interests of the industry they regulate and a propensity for
extending the displacement of competition 347 that would have no coun-
terpart among legislators. Aside from sympathy for, or influence by, the
regulated producers, regulatory agencies tend to develop a symbiosis
with their industries that legislators, again, would not have.348
It has been suggested that vague legislative delegation of policymaking
power is essential to the regulatory conferral of private benefits. 349 To
the extent that this is true, producers unable to secure more specific legis-
lation of the type that would satisfy the proposed version of the policy
requirement would lose their private benefits. 350 Legislative inertia,
therefore, would work against the seekers of anticompetitive benefits,
rather than against those who seek to have the legislature affirmatively
restrict the regulators' power to confer such benefits.35 ' The point is not
that legislatures could never be persuaded to support inefficient regula-
tory restraints desired by private interests, but that a very substantial
portion of such restraints could be expected not to receive this endorse-
ment. The proposed version of the policy requirement thus would result
in a substantial improvement over the Court's displacement-of-competi-
tion version in terms of efficiency.352
346. See Page, supra note 10, at 1110-13; supra notes 334-35 and accompanying text.
347. See 2 A. Kahn, supra note 199, at 111-12.
348. See B. Mitnick, supra note 209, at 209-14 (proposes a model of regulatory capture
that emphasizes industry's power over regulators through its control of needed
information).
349. See Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, supra note 198, at 60-62; Page, supra note 10,
at 1111-12.
350. See Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, supra note 198, at 64 ("[D]elegation provides
a principal means for the legislative production of private goods. Enforcing more rigor-
ous standards for delegation will increase the marginal cost and, other things being equal,
reduce the supply of private-interest legislation." (emphasis in original)). Producer
groups should value legislation specifically authorizing the desired regulatory benefits
much more than vague legislation; aside from state action immunity considerations, spe-
cific legislation would make the hoped-for benefits more certain and durable. When bene-
fits are conferred pursuant to a vague statute, it might well be because this was the best
the private interests could hope to obtain from the legislature. See id. at 60-61. Certainly
the legislative strategy of ambiguity that contributes to regulation conferring private ben-
efits would be much less feasible under the proposed version of the policy requirement.
See id. at 60; see also B. Mitnick, supra note 348, at 331 (special interests may find it
impossible to achieve aims in legislature and seek delegation of power to an agency to
permit greater influence over regulatory decisionmaking there).
351. See Page, supra note 10, at 1112-13.
352. There probably are some actions undertaken by agencies or cities, going beyond
state regulatory policy, that may constitute efficient regulatory solutions to genuine mar-
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CONCLUSION
The state action doctrine is intended to reconcile the conflicting direc-
tives of federal antitrust law and principles of federalism in the state and
local regulatory sector. The Court's insistence on framing its state action
immunity test entirely in procedural terms prompts the question of how
substantive antitrust goals can best be achieved within the procedural
paradigm. This Article answers the question by proposing a strict ver-
sion of the policy requirement of the procedural test, adopting the axio-
matic points of the Court's doctrine as constraints on the proposed
revision. These constraints are that immunity should be extended only to
restraints implementing state policy set by a sovereign part of state gov-
ernment and that the usefulness of agencies and local government as in-
struments of state policy should be protected. Although the Court's
displacement-of-competition version of the policy requirement is in-
tended to achieve both these objectives, close examination of its practical
context shows that it does not succeed.
A fundamental principle underlying the Court's procedural test for
state action immunity is that in balancing "principles of federalism and
the goal of the antitrust laws, unfettered competition in the market-
place," '353 neither should be impaired more than necessary." The dis-
placement-of-competition standard impairs antitrust goals more than is
necessary to accommodate the implementation of sovereign-level state
regulatory policy. The proposed standard, in contrast, would not sub-
stantially burden the formulation and execution of state policies and
would deny immunity to many of the most inefficient types of regulation
imposed by state agencies and local government. In application, the pro-
posed standard would yield results more consistent with the Court's deci-
sions than does the current displacement-of-competition standard.
Although an explicitly substantive test could, of course, impose an even
greater degree of efficiency, the proposed standard represents a much im-
proved balancing of antitrust and federalism goals within the Court's set-
tled doctrinal parameters.
ket imperfections, rather than devices for conferring private benefits. It can be expected
that these actions would have a markedly easier time obtaining a legislative consensus
than exploitative regulatory restraints. See Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, supra note
198, at 64-65.
353. Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 61.
354. See id; City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 415-16.
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